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In this advance, the frontier is the outer edge of the wave-the meeting
point between savagery and civilization.
Frederick Jackson Turner, The Closing of the American Frontier.'
I. Introduction
The civilization of the Internet has been the great quandary facing Internet
regulators over the past decade. The Internet, like Turner's frontier,2 was not a
tabula rasa-at its formation, traditional laws were still available.3 But the
Internet raised new problems that made the enforcement of old laws
problematic, and the Internet soon developed its reputation as an entity free
1. FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 3 (Henry Holt and
Co. 1921) (1920). But see Paul Weingarten, Historians Clash Over Less-Romantic View of Old
West, Ct. TRIB., Jan. 28, 1990, at C6, 1990 WL 2939410 (stating that many new historians
assert that Turner's version of the frontier is "racist, sexist, overly romantic and simply wrong").
2. See TURNER, supra note 1, at 38 ("There is not tabula rasa. The stubborn American
environment is there with its imperious summons to accept its conditions; the inherited ways of
doing things are also there...").
3. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1199, 1250(1998)
("Cyberspace transactions are no different from 'real space' transnational transactions.").
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from government regulation.4 The greatest obstacles to enforcement of
traditional laws are the Internet's anonymity and its multijurisdictionality.
5
Anonymity makes it hard for local prosecutors and victims to discover the
identity of the party responsible for illegal conduct. 6 Even if the party can be
identified, however, multijurisdictionality means that the prosecutor or victim
may not have jurisdiction or face great obstacles in bringing suit against the
offending party.
The problem with enforcement of the inherited laws was not so much a
product of a defect in the language of the laws as it was a product of the
inherent structure of the Intemet. 8 As a result, it should come as no surprise
that despite unilateral efforts by the United States and almost every other nation
to attempt to civilize the Internet, "the closing of the Internet frontier" remains
far from a reality. Although governments have extended traditional laws to the
Internet and have attempted to pass new laws regulating the Internet, these laws
have had limited effectiveness reigning in unwanted conduct.9
The global accessibility of information on the Internet allows an individual
or a business that disagrees with the rules in one jurisdiction to move to a more
lenient country and resume its business with its website remaining accessible
for viewing in the country it fled.10 The global nature of the Internet results in
those countries with less civilized Internet standards becoming havens for
actors who wish to continue their "savage" manners untouched by the laws of
the objecting country.
4. See JOSEPH KiZzA, CIVILIZIG THE INTERNET xi (1998) (stating that the Internet is a
place "where laws are self-made and observed (or broken) at will").
5. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw May Teach, 113 HARv.
L. REv. 501, 505 (1999) (stating that many believe that "[tihe anonymity and multi-
jurisdictionality of cyberspace makes [sic] control by government in cyberspace impossible").
6. See Jay Krasovec, Cyberspace: The Final Frontier, For Regulation?, 31 AKRON L.
REV. 101, 109-10 (1997) (stating that the use of pseudonyms and remailer services allows
individuals to engage in communication on the Internet anonymously).
7. See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1216 ("The Island of Tobago can enact a law that
purports to bind the rights of the whole world. But the effective scope of this law depends on
Tobago's ability to enforce it.").
8. See Lessig, supra note 5, at 506 (asserting that those who believe government control
of the Internet is impossible are wrong because they erroneously assume that the architecture of
the Internet is fixed and cannot be changed).
9. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029,
1045-46 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (dismissing a copyright infringement suit filed against distributors of
peer-to-peer file-sharing software because the software had noninfringing uses and the
distributors had no control over the files shared by users of the software).
10. See Agence-France Press, Neo-Nazi Web Sites Reported to Flee Germany, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 21, 2000, at A5 (reporting that ninety rightist groups had transferred their sites to
the United States in the wake of German authorities cracking down on Internet hate speech).
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The "haven" problem can generally be avoided in two ways. The first is
for the victimized country to attempt to block odious content from reaching its
Internet browsers. Spain has recently implemented this approach by passing
legislation authorizing judges to block sites that do not comply with Spanish
national law." i This approach, however, is onerous on the victimized country,
as it forces the country to search out the content and block it, without placing a
deterrent on the producer of the content to refrain from putting the content on
the Internet in the first place.
The other option to solve the "haven" problem is in the form of regional
and multilateral efforts to regulate the Internet. The greatest benefit of a
multilateral compact is its ability to negate the multijurisdiction problem. If the
offending party is located in a country also a party to the multilateral compact,
it becomes much easier for the victimized country to push the host country to
take action against the offender or to extradite the offender to the victimized
country. The removal of the multijurisdiction obstacle, it is hoped, will make
the laws much easier to enforce and is seen as more efficient than unilateral
blocking of sites because it attempts to deter the objectionable content from
being placed on the Internet from the outset.'
2
The first major multilateral compact aimed at Internet crimes was the
Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime. 3  The purpose of the
Convention on Cybercrime is to pursue "a common criminal policy aimed at the
protection of society against cybercrime... by adopting appropriate legislation
and fostering international co-operation" that defends copyright holders by
making the laws more uniform and providing for international cooperation in
enforcement.1 4  The Convention on Cybercrime focuses primarily on
infringements of copyright, computer-related fraud, child pornography, and
violations of network security.' 5 As of January 11, 2004, thirty-three countries
11. See Julia Scheeres, Europeans Outlaw Net Hate Speech, WIRED.COM, at
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,56294,00.htm (Nov. 9, 2002) ("Spain recently
passed legislation authorizing judges to shut down Spanish sites and block access to U.S. Web
pages that don't comply with national laws.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
12. See Catherine P. Heaven, Note, A Proposal for Removing Road Blocks From the
Information Superhighway By Using an Integrated International Approach to Internet
Jurisdiction, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 373, 400-01 (2001) (suggesting the creation of a
regulatory body to propose Internet regulations for the globe).
13. Convention on Cybercrime, European Treaty Series, No. 185, at http://conven
tions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm (Nov. 23, 2001) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
14. Id.
15. Summary of Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, at http://conventions.
coe.int/Treaty/en/Summaries/Html/185.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2005) (on file with the
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have signed the Convention, including some nonmembers of the Council of
Europe (the United States, Japan, South Africa, and Canada).
16
As an addendum to the Convention on Cybercrime, the Council of Europe
recently has proposed an additional protocol to the Convention (Additional
Protocol) that concerns Internet hate speech. That protocol is the focus of this
Note. This Note first discusses the problem of hate speech generally 17 and then
examines the Council of Europe and the relationship of the United States to that
body. 18 This Note then details the provisions of the Additional Protocol and
examines how they will affect current law in Europe. 19 It then analyzes the
ability of an implemented Protocol to reach conduct originating in the United
States and considers whether the Protocol will cause the United States to
become a haven for Internet hate speech. 20 Lastly, this Note examines solutions
that the United States and Europe could adopt to reduce the probability of the
United States becoming a haven for Internet hate speech.2'
II. Hate Speech Regulations Preceding the Protocol
European regulation of hate speech can be traced to the after-effects of
World War II. After the Holocaust, European countries moved to take steps to
prevent similar atrocities from ever happening again, and hate speech was
targeted for elimination. As a consequence of the interest in proscribing hate
speech, many countries passed laws proscribing the speech and took part in
international agreements aimed at eliminating the speech. The primary
international agreement on hate speech is Article 4 of the International
Washington and Lee Law Review). The Summary states:
The Convention is the first international treaty on crimes committed via the Internet
and other computer networks, dealing particularly with infringements of copyright,
computer-related fraud, child pornography and violations of network security. It
also contains a series of powers and procedures such as the search of computer
networks and interception.
Id.
16. See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of a Treaty, Convention on Cybercrime,
European Treaty Series, No. 185, at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.
asp?NT=185&CM=14&DF=27/01/05&CL=ENG (last visited Jan. 27, 2005) (showing a table of
countries that have signed or ratified the Convention) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
17. Infra Part II.
18. Infra Part II.
19. Infra Part IV.
20. Infra Part V.
21. Infra Part VI.
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Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
2(ICERD). Article 4 provides that parties shall (1)criminalize the
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, (2) declare illegal
and prohibit organizations that promote and incite racial discrimination and
shall recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offense
punishable by law, and (3) prohibit public authorities and public institutions
from promoting or inciting racial discrimination.23 As of January 1, 2000, 155
states have signed ICERD, including all but four members of the Council of
24Europe. The list of countries that have ratified ICERD includes the United
States, but the United States made a reservation indicating its refusal to
undertake any measures that violate the First Amendment.25
As a result of ICERD, all European nations have adopted legislation aimed
at repressing hateful speech.26 France's extensive legislation on combating
racism includes criminalizing the following: (1) inciting hatred or discrimination
on basis of race; (2) wearing emblems reminiscent of crimes against humanity;
and (3) defending or disputing crimes against humanity.27 The criminal law in
Germany makes it a crime to incite hatred and violence against segments of the
population and to disseminate publications that are morally harmful to young
persons (including those that stimulate or incite racial hatred).28 The laws
22. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
23. Id. at 220.
24. See Swiss INSTITUTE OF COMPARATIVE LAW, EUROPEAN COMMISSION AGAINST RACISM
AND INTOLERANCE, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS TO COMBAT RACISM ON THE INTERNET 66 (2000)
[hereinafter LEGAL INSTRUMENTS] (stating that 155 states were party to ICERD as of January 1,
2000, including all member states of the Council of Europe, except Andorra, Liechenstein,
Moldova, and San Marino), available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/human-rights/Ecri/1-ECRI/3-
Generalthemes/3-LegalResearch/2-Combatracism onInternetlCRI(2000)27.pdf (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
25. See id. at 67 ("The United States of America indicated its refusal to accept any
obligation under Art. 4 which would require restriction of the protection afforded by its
constitution and laws to the freedoms of speech, expression and association.").
26. See id. at 13 (stating that its previous report showed that "all European countries have
at their disposal a more or less effective legislative arsenal to repress hateful expressions" and
that a minimum standard imposed by the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of
Racial Hatred is applicable to hateful expressions disseminated via the Internet).
27. See SWISS INSTITUTE OF COMPARATIVE LAw, EUROPEAN COMMISSION AGAINST RACISM
AND INTOLERANCE, LEGAL MEASURES TO COMBAT RACISM ON THE INTERNET (2001) [hereinafter
LEGAL MEASURES] (documenting the criminal laws in France designed to combat racism),
available at http://www.coe.intTf/E/human-rights/Ecri/1-ECRI/3-Generalthemes/3-LegaLRe
search/1-National-legalmeasur es/default.asp#TopOfPage (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
28. See id. (documenting the criminal laws in Germany designed to combat racism). For a
general discussion of Germany's laws combating hate speech, see generally Ronald J.
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governing hate speech have generally been found to extend to the Internet to
the extent the legislation is written in a technically neutral manner.
29
Given this background, the laws necessary to combat racism exist in
Europe. The anonymity and multijurisdictionality of the Internet, however,
have proved problematic for enforcement of these laws. Although all European
countries regulate hate speech, they each have different laws and different
levels of enforcement, frustrating countries with stronger hate speech
regulations. 30 As a result, in order to combat hate speech most effectively,
European nations desired a uniform law. The Council of Europe was given the
task of drafting such a law.
I1. The Council of Europe
A. Functions of the Council of Europe
Established in 1949, the Council of Europe promotes intergovernmental
cooperation in securing democracy in Europe and in preventing the recurrence
of gross violations of human rights.3' Although the Council of Europe had only
ten founding members, it now has forty-five members, all of which are located
in the European region. 32 The Council of Europe has a larger membership than
Krotoszynski, A Comparative Perspective on the First Amendment: Free Speech, Militant
Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity as a Preferred Constitutional Value in Germany, 78
TUL. L. REv. 1549 (2004).
29. See LEGAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 24, at 13 ("As a general rule, the laws governing
the right of communication are drafted in a technically neutral manner, which takes into account
any dissemination of information irrespective of the medium; consequently, they are fully
applicable to messages distributed on the Internet.").
30. See id. ("[Tihe problem therefore lies not so much in the absence of adequate material
rules as in obstacles to their application in the form of characteristics peculiar to the network of
networks, namely its polycentric structure, its ubiquity and the cover of anonymity."); see also
infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text (detailing the problems found by the Council of
Europe in its reports on hate speech).
31. See CONNIE PECK, SUSTAINABLE PEACE: THE ROLE OF THE UN AND REGIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN PREVENTING CONFLICT 101 (1998) (stating that the Council of Europe "was
set up in response to Europe's traumatic experience with the Nazi regime, and its main aim was
to secure democracy in Europe and to prevent the recurrence of gross violations of human
rights").
32. See id. at 101-02 (stating that the Council of Europe had ten founding members); see
also About the Council of Europe, Council of Europe, at http://www.coe.intT/e/Coml
about-coe/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2005) (stating that the Council of Europe currently has forty-six
members, including twenty-one from Central and Eastern Europe) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). The Council of Europe also has one candidate for membership, Belarus,
and five observer countries--Canada, the Holy See, Japan, Mexico, and the United States. See
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the European Union, which has only twenty-five members.33 For membership,
the Council requires a country to achieve and maintain certain standards of
democracy and human rights; these standards include a democratically-elected
parliament, a legal system in line with democratic principles, and a system for
the protection of national minorities.34 Besides size of membership, the
Council of Europe also differs from the European Union in another way:
Actions by the Council of Europe have no legal effect without signature and
ratification by the member countries of the Council.35 As a result, the Council
of Europe is primarily a treaty-making entity.36 Since its formation, the Council
of Europe has concluded 195 treaties.37
B. The Relationship of the United States to the Council of Europe
Although the United States is not a member of the Council of Europe,
participation in the Council of Europe's treaty-making process is not exclusive
to its members.38 The Council of Europe has granted the United States
observer status, which allows the United States to appoint a permanent observer
to the Council of Europe; however, observer status does not give the United
States a seat on the Committee of Ministers or in the Council's Parliamentary
Assembly.39 The Council of Europe invites nonmember states to sign and ratify
The Council of Europe's Member States, The Council of Europe, at
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Con/AboutCoe/Member_states/default.asp (last visited Jan. 27, 2005)
(listing the members of Council of Europe) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
33. The EU at a Glance, Europa, at http://europa.eu.int/abc/keyfigures/index-en.htm (last
visited Jan. 27, 2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
34. See PECK, supra note 31, at 102-03 (stating the requirements to become a member of
the Council of Europe).
35. See JORG POLAKIEWiCZ, TREATY-MAKING IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 10 (1999) ("It
should be stressed that the treaties are not legal instruments of the Organisation as such, but owe
their existence to the consent of those member states that sign and ratify them.").
36. See id. at 7 (stating that "treaties are the most visible contribution of the Council of
Europe").
37. See Complete List of the Council of Europe's Treaties, The Council of Europe, at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Common/ListeTraites.asp?CM=8&CL=ENG (last visited Jan.
27, 2005) (stating that 196 treaties have been concluded since the formation the Council of
Europe) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
38. See PoLAriEwiCz, supra note 35, at 33 (stating that "[plarticipation in most Council of
Europe treaties is not exclusively limited to the member states of the Council of Europe").
39. See The United States of America and the Council of Europe, The Council of Europe,
at http://www.coe.int/T/E/ComAboutCoe/Member_states/e_usa.asp (last visited Jan. 27,
2005) (stating that countries with observer status can "appoint a permanent observer to the
Council of Europe and send observers to the committees of experts open for participation to all
member states; [however,] [o]bserver status gives no right to be represented on the Committee
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its treaties when the Council wishes to broaden the scope of the treaty to
include non-European countries.40 The United States has signed five treaties in
the course of its contact with the Council of Europe and has ratified two of
them.4 Among the most prominent treaties the United States has signed is the
Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime, which provides a multilateral
framework for combating various Internet crimes, including copyright
infringement, fraud, and child pornography.42 The United States, however, has
yet to ratify the Convention.43
C. The Council of Europe's Involvement in Hate Speech
Over the past few years, the Council of Europe has become increasingly
involved in the problems posed by racism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism in
Europe. In 1993, the Council of Europe issued a Declaration and Plan of
Action on Combating Racism, Xenophobia, Anti-Semitism, and Intolerance.
an
The Plan of Action provided for a "European Youth Campaign against Racism,
Xenophobia, Anti-Semitism and Intolerance. ' 45 Additionally, the Council
of Ministers or the Parliamentary Assembly unless a specific decision has been taken by one of
these organs on its own behalf") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
40. See POLAKIEWICZ, supra note 35, at 33 (stating that open treaties are open to accession
by nonmember states--even non-European states-provided that they have been formally
invited to accede by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe).
41. See United States: All legal acts accomplished as of Jan. 12, 2004, The Council of
Europe, at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.aspCM=14&MA=999&
PO=USA&SI=I&CL=ENG (last visited Jan. 27, 2005) (stating that as of Jan. 27, 2005, the
United States has signed five Council of Europe treaties and has ratified two of them) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
42. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (detailing the provisions of the
Convention on Cybercrime).
43. See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of a Treaty, supra note 16 (showing that the
United States has not ratified the Convention). But see President George W. Bush, Message to
the Senate of the United States, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/2003
1117-11.html (Nov. 23, 2003) (showing that President Bush only recently transmitted the
Convention to the United States Senate for its consideration) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
44. Council of Europe, Declaration and Plan of Action on Combating Racism,
Xenophobia, Antisemitism, and Intolerance, at http://www.coe.intlT/E/human-rights/Ecri/5-
Archives/2-Othertexts/2-ViennaSummit/Plan-of Action/Plan ofActionViennaSummit.
asp (Oct. 9, 1993) [hereinafter Declaration and Plan of Action] (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); see also Peck, supra note 31, at 108 ("Alarmed by the upsurge of racism,
xenophobia, and antisemitism, the 1993 meeting of the council's Heads of State and
Government adopted a Declaration and Plan of Action.").
45. See Declaration and Plan of Action, supra note 44 (launching "a broad European
Youth Campaign to mobilise the public in favour of a tolerant society based on the equal dignity
62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 781 (2005)
asked governments to re-examine their legislation, and the European
Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) was established to review
member states' legislation and policies and propose further action at the local,
national, and regional levels.4 6
In reporting on the conditions faced by minorities and immigrants, the
Commission examined the rights accorded these groups, and the protections
available to them, in each member country.47 The Commission also examined
portrayals in the media, including the Internet, and found several concerns. For
example, the Commission expressed concern regarding the steep rise in the
number of racist websites in Germany. 48 In Austria, the Commission expressed
concern in regard to the amount of circulation of anti-Semitic material through
the Internet. 49 The Commission cited the Internet as one of the main focal
points of anti-Semitic propaganda in the Netherlands and stated that there has
been a reported rise of discrimination on the Internet in that country towards
Jews, Turks, and Moroccans. 50 The Commission was also troubled by the lack
of enforcement of Internet-content regulations in some countries5' and by
of all its members and against manifestations of racism, xenophobia, antisemitism and
intolerance"); see also Peck, supra note 31, at 108 (stating that its Plan of Action included a
European Youth Campaign against Racism, Xenophobia, Anti-Semitism and Intolerance, which
"includes training courses, high-profile events, seminars, and the production of educational
materials").
46. See Declaration and Plan of Action, supra note 44 (inviting members to re-examine
their legislation and setting up a committee of governmental experts to review members'
policies, propose further action, formulate general policy recommendations, and examine
international legal instruments).
47. See, e.g., COMMISSION AGAINST RACISM AND INTOLERANCE, THIRD REPORT ON
GERMANY passim (2004) (examining Germany's Constitution, citizenship laws, criminal laws,
and civil and administrative laws), available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/human-rights/Ecri/1-
ECRI/2-Country-by-country-approach/Germany/third reportGermany.pdf (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
48. See id. at 15 ("ECRI is concerned about the steep rise in numbers of racist intemet
sites originating in Germany ... ").
49. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION AGAINST RACISM AND INTOLERANCE, SECOND REPORT ON
AUSTRIA 14 (2001) ("[Alntisemitism is still present in Austria and manifests itself in a variety of
ways. These include circulation of antisemitic material (notably via the Internet) .... ),
available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/human-rights/Ecri/1-ECRI/2-Country-by-country-app
roach/Austria/PDF_.CBC2Austria.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
50. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION AGAINST RACISM AND INTOLERANCE, SECOND REPORTON
THE NETHERLANDS 14, 16 (2001) (stating that, according to MDI, racist offenses have been on
the rise, with most of the offenses of an anti-Semitic nature, but also discrimination against
Turks and Moroccans), available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/human-rights/Ecri/1-ECRI/2-
Country-by-country-approach/Netherlands/CBC2%20Netherlands.pdf (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
51. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION AGAINST RACISM AND INTOLERANCE, SECOND
REPORT ON GREECE 14, at http://www.coe.intlT/E/human-rights/Ecri/5-Archives/l-EC
790
INTERNET HATE SPEECH
European countries with less stringent regulations acting as a safe haven for
content.52
In response to its findings, the ECRI adopted a general policy
recommendation on December 15, 2000.53 The ECRI recommended that the
Council of Europe include the issue of suppression of hate speech in the
pending Convention on Cybercrime in order to strengthen international
cooperation and allow law enforcement to take more efficient action against the
dissemination of hate speech.54 While an Internet hate speech protocol was
initially added to the Convention on Cybercrime, it was removed when it
became apparent that the United States (whose signature was desired for the
other provisions) would not sign the Convention if the Internet hate speech
provisions were attached.55 Instead, the Council of Europe made the Internet
hate speech measure a separate protocol. On November 7, 2002, the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted the "Additional
Protocol to the Convention on cybercrime, concerning the criminilisation of
acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems."
5 6
The Additional Protocol was opened for signature on January 28, 2003, and, as
of January 10, 2004, has been signed by twenty-three members of the Council
of Europe, including Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and
RI's work/5-CBCSecondReports/Greece/CBC2%20Greece.pdf (2000) ("Although there are
legal provisions condemning incitement to racial hatred in general as well as legal and other
provisions aimed at combating racism and intolerance in the electronic media, these are virtually
unused.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
52. See LEGAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 24, at 27 ("This problem of 'safe havens' is not
limited to racist contents, but also concerns revisionist sites whose existence has to do with the
fact that there is no criminal legislation in that regard in certain European countries.").
53. EUROPEAN COMMISSION AGAINST RACISM AND INTOLERANCE, GENERAL POLICY
RECOMMENDATION No. 6: COMBATING THE DISSEMINATION OF RACIST, XENOPHOBIC, AND
ANTISEMITIC MATERIEL VIA THE INTERNET 1, at http://www.coe.int/T/E/human-rights/ Ecri/I-
ECRl/3-Generalthemes/1-PolicyRecommendations/RecommendationN%B06/Rec%
206%20en.pdf (2001) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
54. See id. at 5 (listing the recommendations of the European Commission against Racism
and Intolerance).
55. See Michelle Madigan, Internet Hate-Speech Ban Called 'Chilling', PCWorld.com, at
http://www.pcworld.com/resource/printable/article/0,aid,107499,00.asp (Dec. 2, 2002) ("The
Council of Europe's original Convention on Cybercrime in 2001 also contained a hate-speech
measure, but it was dropped at the last minute to gain support from the United States ....") (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
56. Additional Protocol to the Convention on cybercrime, concerning the criminalization
of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems, Jan. 28, 2003,
Europ. T.S. No. 189 [hereinafter Additional Protocol].
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Sweden; however, as of that date, only two countries had ratified the treaty.
57
The Additional Protocol will take force once five countries ratify it.
5a
IV. The Additional Protocol on Internet Hate Speech
A. The Provisions of the Additional Protocol
The provisions of the Additional Protocol can be divided into five types of
conduct that parties to the Protocol are required to criminalize. First, it requires
each party to criminalize "distributing, or otherwise making available, racist
and xenophobic material to the public through a computer system. '"59 But a
party may choose not to make the conduct criminal if the conduct is not
associated with hatred or violence and other effective civil or administrative
remedies are available. 60 A party may also reserve the right not to apply this
provision to speech that is purely discriminatory, and not associated with hatred
or violence, if the country cannot criminalize purely discriminatory speech
because of established principles in its legal system. 61 The requirement that the
communication be "to the public" excludes emails and private communications
from the provision.62 The scope of the Protocol was limited to public
communications because of concerns that private communications are protected
57. Council of Europe, Chart of Signatures and ratifications of a treaty, Europ. T.S. No.
189, at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/CommunChercheSig.asp?NT=189&CM=8&DF=27/
01/05&CL=ENG (last visited Jan. 27, 2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
58. See Additional Protocol, supra note 56, at 11 (stating that the Protocol will "enter into
force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of three months after the
date on which five States have expressed their consent to be bound by the Protocol, in
accordance with the provisions of Article 9").
59. Id. at 8.
60. See id. at 8-9 (stating that a party may reserve the right not to attach criminal liability
where material advocates, promotes, or incites discrimination that is not associated with hatred
or violence, provided that other effective remedies are available); see also Explanatory Report,
Additional Protocol to the Convention on cybercrime, concerning the criminalization of acts of
a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems, Jan. 28, 2003 [hereinafter
Explanatory Report], 32, Europ. T.S. No. 189 (stating that such other remedies may be civil or
administrative).
61. See Additional Protocol, supra note 56, at 9 ("[A] Party may reserve the right not to
apply paragraph 1 to those cases of discrimination for which, due to established principles in its
national legal system concerning freedom of expression, it cannot provide for effective remedies
as referred to in the said paragraph 2.").
62. See Explanatory Report, supra note 60, T 29 ("The term ... makes it clear that private
communications or expressions communicated or transmitted through a computer system fall
outside the scope of this provision.").
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by the European Convention on Human Rights.63 But "to the public" does
include exchanging such material in a chat room or posting similar messages in
newsgroups, which can include content that would require a password to access
(if the password would be given to anyone meeting certain criteria).64
Second, the Additional Protocol requires each country to criminalize the
act of directing a threat to a person through the Internet purely because of race,
national origin, or religion.65 This provision does not include the reservation
right present in some of the other articles of this Protocol, so parties are not
allowed to opt-out of this provision. 66 Third, the Protocol requires each country
to criminalize the act of publicly insulting a person through a computer system
because of the person's race, national origin, or religion.67 A party, however,
may choose to require the condition that the victim be exposed to hatred,
contempt, or ridicule, or a party may reserve the right to refrain from applying
this article altogether. 68
Fourth, each party must pass legislation making it a crime to distribute or
make available through the Internet "material which denies, grossly minimises,
63. See id. (stating that private communications "are protected by Article 8 of the
ECHR.").
64. Id. [ 31.
65. See Additional Protocol, supra note 56, at 9 (criminalizing racist and xenophobic
motivated threats). Article 4 states:
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to
establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally
and without right, the following conduct: threatening, through a computer system,
with the commission of a serious criminal offence as defined under its domestic
law, (i) persons for the reason that they belong to a group, distinguished by race,
colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, as well as religion, if used as a pretext
for any of these factors, or (ii) a group of persons which is distinguished by any of
these characteristics.
Id.
66. See id. (providing for no right of reservation in Article 4); id. at 11 (stating that parties
may only avail themselves of the reservations provided for in Articles 3, 5, and 6 of this
Protocol and in Article 22 of the Convention, and that no other reservations may be made).
67. See id. at 9 (criminalizing racist and xenophobic motivated insults). Article 5 states:
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to
establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally
and without right, the following conduct: insulting publicly, through a computer
system, (i) persons for the reason that they belong to a group distinguished by race,
colour, national or ethnic origin, as well as religion, if used as a pretext for any of
these factors; or (ii) a group of persons which is distinguished by any of these
characteristics.
Id.
68. See id. (providing for options for parties to limit the scope of Article 5).
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This provision includes not only the Holocaust, but also genocides and crimes
established by other international courts, such as the tribunals established to
study genocides in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.70 The Protocol
provides, however, that a country may reserve the right not to have this section
apply to it.7 1 A country may also choose to require that the conduct be
committed with the intent to "incite hatred, discrimination or violence against
any individual or group of individuals, based on race, colour, descent or
national or ethnic origin, as well as religion. ,72 Finally, the Protocol requires
parties to criminalize "aiding or abetting" the commission of any of the offenses
established by the Protocol.7 3
In addition to criminalizing conduct, the Protocol also makes prosecution
of offenders easier because it provides for extradition between parties by
extending the scope of the extradition provisions of the Convention on
69. See id. at 9-10 (criminalizing denial, gross minimization, approval or justification of
genocide or crimes against humanity). Article 6 states:
Each Party shall adopt such legislative measures as may be necessary to establish
the following conduct as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed
intentionally and without right: distributing or otherwise making available, through
a computer system to the public, material which denies, grossly minimises,
approves or justifies acts constituting genocide or crimes against humanity, as
defined by international law and recognised as such by final and binding decisions
of the International Military Tribunal, established by the London Agreement of 8
April 1945, or any other international court established by relevant international
instruments and whose jurisdiction is recognised by the Party.
Id.
70. See Explanatory Report, supra note 60, 40 (stating that the scope of the provision is
not only limited to crimes committed by the Nazi regime and established as such by the
Nuremberg Tribunal but also extends "to genocides and crimes against humanity established by
other international courts," such as the International Criminal Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia, for Rwanda, and the Permanent International Criminal Court); see also Jonathan
Band, Banning Hate Speech Poses Hidden Risks, THE JERUSALEM REP., Dec. 30, 2002, at 55
(expressing concern that the language of the Protocol could be held to include genocides
recognized by the Arab League and subjecting to liability those historians and reporters who
deny Israel's guilt for the plight of Arab refugees or for minimizing the scope of Jenin).
71. See Additional Protocol, supra note 56, at 5 (stating that a party may "reserve the fight
not to apply, in whole or in part, paragraph 1 of this article").
72. Id.
73. See id. (criminalizing aiding and abetting). Article 7 states:
Each party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to
establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally
and without right, aiding or abetting the commission of any of the offences
established in accordance with this Protocol, with intent that such offence be
committed.
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Cybercrime to include the Internet hate speech crimes established by the
Additional Protocol.7a
B. Liability Under the Protocol: Internet Users and Internet
Service Providers
The Protocol primarily provides for liability of individuals who actually
post the racist content on the Internet, and limits the liability of Intemet Service
Providers (ISPs) who serve as mere conduits of the speech. All of the offenses
listed in the Protocol have a requirement that the conduct be "intentional.
75
The Protocol does not define what can be considered "intentional" conduct and
leaves its meaning up to each party.76 The Explanatory Report, however, states
that the "intent" requirement will limit the liability of ISPs that merely serve as
a conduit for a website or bulletin board containing the racist or xenophobic
material.77 As a result, the effect of the requirement should be to limit the
liability of ISPs. Individuals who post the material will generally meet the
intent requirement as long as they intentionally posted the material on the
Internet, and liability therefore will fall on Internet users.
Although the Protocol limits the liability of ISPs, if a country adopts an
expansive definition of "intent," an ISP could be held liable. For instance,
nothing in the Protocol prevents a country from finding a "permissive intent"
when an ISP receives notification of the racist or xenophobic speech by a
country or third party and fails to take steps to remove the odious content.78
74. See id. ("The Parties shall extend the scope of application of the measures defined in
Articles 14 to 21 and Articles 23 to 35 of the Convention, to Articles 2 to 7 of this Protocol.");
see also Convention on Cybercrime, Europ. T.S. No. 185 (Nov. 23,2001) (providing, in Article
24, for parties to include criminal offenses described as extraditable offenses), available at
http://conventions.coe. int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); see also Explanatory Report, supra note 60, 3 (stating that one of the
purposes of the Additional Protocol is to facilitate extradition).
75. See Explanatory Report, supra note 60, 25 ("All the offences contained in the
Protocol must be committed 'intentionally' for criminal liability to apply.").
76. See id. ("The drafters of the Protocol, as those of the Convention, agreed that the exact
meaning of 'intentionally' should be left to national interpretation.").
77. Id. The Explanatory Report states:
It is not sufficient, for example, for a service provider to be held criminally liable
under this provision, that such a service provider served as a conduit for, or hosted
a website or newsroom containing such material, without the required intent under
domestic law in the particular case. Moreover, a service provider is not required to
monitor conduct to avoid criminal liability.
Id.
78. See id. (stating that an ISP cannot be held liable as a conduit "without the required
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This situation is similar to Germany's Information and Communications
Service Act of 1997, which holds ISPs liable if they know of the content, have
the ability to block it, and fail to take remedial action.79
Although the Protocol does not require countries to define "intent" in
any particular manner, members of the European Union that sign the
Protocol must implement the Protocol in accordance with the European
Union's Directive on Electronic Commerce-this Directive limits the
liability of ISPs. Article 12 of the Directive says that ISPs are not liable for
information transmitted on the condition that the provider "(a) does not
initiate the transmission; (b) does not select the receiver of the
transmission; and (c) does not select or modify the information contained in
the transmission. ''81 The Directive additionally provides that ISPs have no
duty to monitor conduct; Article 15 states that countries may not impose "a
general obligation on providers ... to monitor the information which they
transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or
circumstances indicating illegal activity.,
82
In addition to limiting the liability of ISPs acting as mere conduits and
providing that ISPs have no duty to monitor content, the Directive limits
the liability of ISPs when they are hosting information. Nonetheless, ISPs
still have obligations. Article 14 of the Directive states that providers are
not liable for information that they store, on the condition that the provider
does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or acts expeditiously to
intent under domestic law in the particular case").
79. See JOSEPH KIZZA, CIVILIZING THE INTERNET: GLOBAL CONCERNS AND EFFORTS
TOWARD REGULATION 121 (1998) ("Service providers are not responsible for outside content
that they keep ready for usage without having an influence on it unless the content is known to
them and they have the technical capabilities to prevent its dissemination.").
80. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (stating that the Council of Europe has
a larger membership than the European Union; the Council of Europe has forty-five members,
and the European Union has only twenty-five).
81. Directive 2000/3 1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000
on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the
Internal Market 12, at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/ecommerce/legal/documents/
2 00 0- 3 lec/
2000_3l ec..en.pdf (2000) [hereinafter EU Directive on Electronic Commerce] (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). But this Article does not "affect the possibility for a court
or administrative authority, in accordance with Member States' legal systems, of requiring the
service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement." Id. at 13.
82. Id. at 13. Member states may, however, "establish obligations for ISP's [sic] to
inform the competent public authorities of alleged illegal activities undertaken or information
provided by recipients of their service or obligations to communicate to the competent
authorities, at their request, information enabling the identification of recipients of their service
with whom they have storage agreements." Id.
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remove or disable access to the information upon obtaining such
knowledge.
83
As a result, when Germany implemented the Directive, it kept its
provisions requiring ISPs to remove illegal content of which they are aware
and which they have the capability of removing. Section 10 of Germany's
Act on Utilization of Teleservices 84 states that an ISP will not be liable for
storing third-party information if the ISP "acts expeditiously to remove or
to disable access to the information.
85
The limited liability of ISPs for criminal conduct will also govern how
countries implement the Protocol for the crime of "aiding and abetting" the
commission of any of the offenses.86 The Protocol requires the same mens
rea for aiding and abetting as for the other offenses.87 The explanatory
report states that "although the transmission of racist and xenophobic
material through the Internet requires the assistance of service providers as
a conduit, a service provider that does not have the criminal intent cannot
incur liability under this action.",88 This is consistent with the way "aiding
and abetting" has been defined in other European countries, for purposes of
establishing liability of ISPs. For instance, in Switzerland, a director of a
telephone company was convicted for aiding and abetting by failing to take
83. See id. (stating when ISPs can be held liable for hosting illegal content). Article 14
states:
Where an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of
information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that
the service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a
recipient of the service, on condition that: (a) the provider does not have actual
knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is
not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is
apparent; or (b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.
Id.
84. In Germany, this Act is entitled Elektronischer Geschiftsverkehr-Gesetz (EGG). The
text of the Act is available in German at http://www.rws-verlag.de/volltext/Oleggol.pdf.
85. Shigenori Matsui, The ISP's Liability for Defamation on the Internet 7, at
http://www.iias.or.jp/research/reshoumodel/20021129/82OMatsui.pdf (last visited Jan. 27,
2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
86. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (concerning the criminalization of aiding
and abetting).
87. See Explanatory Report, supra note 60, 145 ("Liability arises for aiding or abetting
where the person who commits a crime established in the Protocol is aided by another person
who also intends that the crime be committed.").
88. Id. The Explanatory Report further states that there is no duty on a service provider to
monitor content actively to avoid criminal liability under this provision. Id.
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corrective action to thwart sex chatlines operated by his company after the
company was notified of the criminal conduct by the Attorney General. 89
C. Civil Liability Under the Protocol
The Additional Protocol primarily contemplates criminal liability for
engaging in conduct prohibited by the Protocol.90 The lone contemplation of civil
liability in the text of the Protocol is a provision allowing parties the option not to
create a criminal offense for distributing racist and xenophobic material to the
public through a computer system if the conduct is not associated with hatred or
violence and other effective remedies are available (including civil remedies). 9'
Despite the Protocol's very limited reference to civil liability, offenders can still
face civil liability as a result of the Protocol.
France, a signator of the Protocol, allows persons who have been victimized
by the commission of a criminal offense to commence an action civile (civil
action) against the party who has committed the criminal offense.92 As the result
of an action civile, the victim can receive damages, restitution, and recovery of
legal costs.9 3 Although an action civile is generally reserved only for those
victims who have "personally suffered the harm directly caused by the offence,"
France allows associations to commence the action where provided for by law.
94
Most relevantly, French law provides that antiracism groups may commence an
action civile with respect to certain offenses. 95 The ability of an antiracist group
89. See LEGAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 24, at 47 (stating that a PTI" director was
convicted of aiding and abetting the publication of obscene material because of the sex chatlines
operated by individuals via the telephone networks (making them accessible to minors) and that
the Attorney General's department had on several occasions drawn the PT1"s attention to the
possibility that children might listen to or participate in pornographic conversations and the
criminal conduct, but PTI" took no action).
90. See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text (discussing the Protocol's
criminalization of certain hate speech).
91. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (noting a condition of the Protocol under
which parties can choose not to make certain conduct criminal).
92. See CHRISTIAN DADAMO & SUSAN FARRAN, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 201-03 (2d
ed. 1996) (stating generally the procedures for commencing an action civile in France).
93. See id. at 201 (stating remedies available to victims who commence an action civile).
94. See id. at 202 (stating who has the right to commence an action civile).
95. See THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REV. 41 art. 2-1 (Kock and Frase,
trans. 1988) (providing under which Penal Code statutes and under what conditions an
association that proposes to fight racism may exercise the rights granted a civil party); see also
DADAMO & FARRAN, supra note 92, at 202 (stating that consumer associations, antiracism,
antisexual violence, and protection of children associations have the right to sue in respect of
certain offenses); Richard Vogler, Criminal Procedure in France, in COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL
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to commence an action civile was most prominently displayed in Yahoo., Inc. v.
La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme.96 In this case, two French
student unions, La Ligue Contre Le Recisme et L'Antisemitisme (LICRA) and
L'Union Des Etudiants Jurifs de France (UEJF) brought an action civile against
Yahoo! because Yahoo!'s website advertised Nazi memorabilia for sale, in
violation of a French criminal statute.97
Given France's generous laws allowing associations formed to combat
racism to bring civil actions against producers of hate speech, in implementing the
Protocol, France will probably continue to allow these associations to bring an
action against individuals or corporations. As a result, although the Protocol
primarily contemplates criminal sanctions for violations, violators may also find
themselves subject to civil liability.
D. Impact of the Additional Protocol in Europe
All European countries have in place laws aimed at repressing hate speech,
and these laws often extend to hate speech posted on the Intemet.98 However, the
PROCEDURE 14, 26 (John Hatchard et al. eds., 1996) ("A group or organisation (e.g. a bank of
society) may become a civil party provided that its overall interests, and not merely those of
individual members, have been clearly prejudiced.").
96. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 379 F.3d 1120(9th
Cir. 2004). La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme (LICRA) and L'Union Des
Etudiants Juifs De France (UEJF) are French nonprofit organizations dedicated to eliminating
anti-Semitism. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp.
2d 1181, 1183 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev'd, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004). On April 5, 2000,
LICRA sent a "cease and desist" letter to Yahoo!'s Santa Clara headquarters informing Yahoo!
that the sale of Nazi- and Third Reich-related goods through its auction services violates French
law and threatening Yahoo! with legal action unless it took corrective action. Id. at 1184.
LICRA and UEJF subsequently utilized the United States Marshal's Office to serve Yahoo!
with process in California and filed a civil complaint against Yahoo! in French court. Id. The
French court found that approximately 1000 Nazi- and Third Reich-related objects were being
offered for sale on Yahoo!'s auction site. Id. The French court concluded that the Yahoo!
auction site violated the French Criminal Code, which prohibits exhibition of Nazi propaganda
and artifacts for sale, and issued an order requiring Yahoo! to prohibit French citizen access to
those auctions. Id. at 1184-85. Yahoo! subsequently commenced action in the United States
District Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the French order was not enforceable. Id. at
1186. The United States District Court granted the declaratory judgment on the grounds that the
posting of the material on Yahoo!'s website was protected speech. Id. at 1193-94. The Ninth
Circuit reversed on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction over LICRA and UEJF. Yahoo!,
Inc., 379 F.3d at 1123.
97. See id. at 1184 (stating that LICRA and UEJF filed a civil complaint against Yahoo!
in the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris for Yahoo!'s violation of Section R645-1 of the
French Criminal Code).
98. See LEGAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 24, at 13 (stating that its previous report showed
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Council of Europe's Additional Protocol would make significant changes to the
legislation already in place. The most visible change is greater restrictions on
posting revisionist literature challenging the existence of genocides. 99 The
Additional Protocol includes broad language making it a crime to deny or
minimize genocides. 1°° However, only France and Switzerland currently have in
place legislation comparative in its breadth to that of the Council of Europe' s.101
Germany, Belgium, and Austria have in place similar legislation, but it is limited
to denials of genocide committed by the Nazis. 102 However, the Additional
Protocol does allow countries the option not to apply that Article, so it is unclear
how many countries will choose to reserve that right. 103
The other major effect of the Protocol will be to further intergovernmental
cooperation in prosecution of offenders by removing obstructions to prosecutions
when the source is located in another European country. 104 The Explanatory
Report states that one of the primary reasons for the adoption of the Protocol is to
facilitate international cooperation, especially extradition and mutual legal
assistance. 105 A complaint present in the reports of the European Commission on
Racism and Intolerance was the disparity in the enforcement and the language of
the laws. 106 The Protocol should provide the increased cooperation and the
uniformity needed to close that gap.
that all European countries have at their disposal an effective legislative arsenal to repress
hateful expressions, and that a minimum standard imposed by the United Nations Convention
on the Elimination of Racial Hatred is applicable to hateful expressions disseminated via the
Internet); id. at 30 (stating that in many European countries, Internet sites are treated like the
press).
99. See id. at 27 (stating that revisionist sites have a safe haven in those countries that do
not criminalize posting revisionist literature on the Internet).
100. See Additional Protocol, supra note 56, at 9-10 (requiring parties to criminalize
distributing, through a computer to the public, material that denies, grossly minimizes,
approves, or justifies acts constituting genocides or crimes against humanity).
101. See LEGAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 24, at 14 (stating that in France it is an offense to
"dispute crimes against humanity," and that Switzerland punishes the offense).
102. See id. (stating that in Germany, Belgium, and Austria, it is a crime to deny genocide
committed by the Nazis).
103. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (discussing a provision in the protocol
that states that a country may choose to opt-out of the provision requiring countries to
criminalize speech minimizing or denying the existence of a genocide).
104. See Explanatory Report, supra note 60, 3 (stating that the Additional Protocol
facilitates international cooperation, especially extradition and mutual legal assistance).
105. Id.
106. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION AGAINST RACISM AND INTOLERANCE, SECOND REPORT ON
GREECE, supra note 51, at 14 ("Although there are legal provisions condemning incitement to
racial hatred in general as well as legal and other provisions aimed at combating racism and
intolerance in the electronic media, these are virtually unused."); see also LEGAL INSTRUMENTS,
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Although the Protocol will create greater uniformity of laws, the reservations
present in the Protocol will still result in some disparity. The Protocol does not
state whose law would control in a conflict, but in a dispute involving an ISP and
a conflict of law between two countries that are members of the European
Union, 10 7 the European Union Directive on Electronic Commerce would govern.
Article 3 of the European Union Directive on Electronic Commerce provides that
ISPs are governed by the laws of the member state in which they are
established. 0 8 However, the Directive provides for an exception to that choice of
law when the recipient country's choice of law is necessary for the prevention,
investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offenses, including "the fight
against any incitement to hatred on grounds of race, sex, religion or nationality,
and violations of human dignity concerning individual persons."'1 9  This
exception is likely to encompass criminal Internet hate speech legislation, so the
general rule that ISPs are only subject to the law of the country in which they are
established does not appear to apply to Internet hate speech. But even if Internet
hate speech falls into this exception, the European Union Directive still governs
the procedure that a country must follow before taking action against an ISP
established in another member country. The Directive provides that the enforcing
country must first ask the country of establishment to take action, and if the
country of establishment does not take such measures, or the measures taken are
inadequate, the enforcing country must notify the Commission and the country of
establishment of its intention to take such action against the ISP."
supra note 24, at 27 ("This problem of 'safe havens' ... also concerns revisionist sites whose
existence has to do with the fact that there is no criminal legislation in that regard in certain
European countries.").
107. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (stating that the Council of Europe has
forty-five members and the European Union has only twenty-five members).
108. See EU Directive on Electronic Commerce, supra note 81, at 9 ("Member States may
not, for reasons falling with the coordinated field, restrict the freedom to provide information
society services from another Member State."); id. at 4 ("[I]n order to effectively guarantee
freedom to provide services and legal certainty for suppliers and recipients of services, such
information society services should in principle be subject to the law of the Member State in
which the service provider is established.").
109. Id. at9.
110. See id. at 10 (listing the steps a Member State must take before commencing action
against an ISP established in another member State). Article 3(b) states:
[B]efore taking the measures in question and without prejudice to court
proceedings, including preliminary proceedings and acts carried out in the
framework of a criminal investigation, the Member state has:
-- asked the Member State referred to in paragraph I to take measures
and the latter did not take such measures, or they were inadequate,
-- notified the Commission and the Member State referred to in
paragraph 1 of its intention to take such measures.
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The Protocol will only have effect if it is actually ratified by the members of
the Council of Europe. So far, only two countries have ratified the Additional
Protocol."' However, this should not be taken as a sign of dilatoriness of
European countries to implement the Additional Protocol, nor does this mean
these treaties will not be implemented. The Council of Europe has a good track
record for implementation of its agreements: 1 2 Of the 195 treaties approved by
the Council of Europe, only 35 of them have not yet entered into force, and many
of those treaties have only been opened for signature within the past five years."
13
It is common for ratification of treaties and their entering into force to take a few
years, so the lack of rapid accession to the Protocol is not unusual.
114
Additionally, because many European countries have prior laws regulating hate
speech on the Internet, animosity to the Additional Protocol in Europe is unlikely.
The problem of hate speech in Europe was also recently highlighted by the
publication of photographs of Prince Harry wearing a Nazi swastika at a costume
party.-"5 Because of the European interest in curbing hate speech, ratification is
likely." 
6
E. Attempts by European Countries To Enforce Their Internet Laws
Against Foreign Content
The effect of the Protocol and the hate speech legislation adopted by
Europe is likely to extend beyond the parties to the agreement. European
nations have a history of attempting to enforce their Internet content laws
Id.
111. See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of a Treaty, Europ. T.S. No. 189, at
http://conventions.coe.intflreaty/EN/searchsig.asp?NT=189&CM=8&DF=24/1 1/03 (last visited
Jan. 27, 2005) (showing that only two countries have ratified the Additional Protocol) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
112. See PoLAKiEwicz, supra note 35, at 14 ("It can be said, however, that the record of
ratifications of Council of Europe treaties is more favourable than that of many other
international or European organisations.").
113. See Complete List of the Council of Europe's Treaties, supra note 37 (listing all of the
treaties opened for signature and stating when they entered into force).
114. See id. (showing the date the treaty was opened for signature and the date the treaty
entered into force).
115. See Alan Cowell, A Prince Who Forgot History Angers Many, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 14,
2005, at A12 (concerning photographs published by the British tabloid The Sun of Prince Harry
wearing a Nazi swastika armband).
116. See LEGAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 24, at 13 (stating that "all European countries at
their disposal have a more or less effective legislative arsenal to repress hateful expressions,"
and that these criminal provisions are applicable to hateful expressions disseminated via the
Internet).
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against content uploaded from sources outside Europe, and they view their
jurisdiction based on where the content was read. Such litigation has produced
three high-profile cases: Toben, Somm, and Yahoo!.
1. Toben
Frederick Toben is an Australian immigrant from Germany. 117 From
Australia, he runs the Adelaide Institute and its companion website, but the site
appears to be hosted on an American server." 8 One of the arguments of the
Institute is that the Nazis never used gas chambers to murder Jews and others
during the Holocaust. 19 Although the website is not maintained in Germany
and is written in English, this site is accessible by German Internet users and
contains content in violation of a German law prohibiting the dissemination of
material challenging the existence of the Holocaust. 20 Frederick Toben was
arrested in 1999 when he was on a visit to Germany and was charged for
violating the German statute because of the content of his site and because of
pamphlets he had distributed while in Germany.' 2 1 A lower court sentenced
Toben for the distribution of the pamphlets, but held that the German statute
117. See Robyn Weisman, Germany Bans Foreign Web Site for Nazi Content,
NEWSFACTOR NETWORK, at http://www.newsfactor.comstory.xhtml?story-id=6063 (last visited
Jan. 27, 2005) ("Though German-born, Toben has lived in Australia for most of his life and is a
citizen of that country.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
118. See Adelaide Institute, at http://www.adelaideinstitute.org (last visited Dec. 1, 2004)
(hosting the website of the Adelaide Institute) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see also Terry Lane, Censoring the Adelaide Institute's Web Site is Futile,
ONLINEOPINION, at http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view. asp?article= 1126 (Nov. 30, 2000)
("Now we have the Internet, and Dr. Toben's Adelaide Institute website appears to be located
on an American server.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The location of
the Adelaide Institute's website on an American server stems from Australian law. Australia,
like Germany, prohibits hate speech, and it has ordered Frederick Toben to shut down his
website. See generally Toben v. Jones (2003) 129 F.C.R. 515 (affirming determination of the
Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission that Toben' s website is likely to
offend, insult, humiliate, or intimidate Jews, and that website was not reasonable and in good
faith academic belief).
119. See Jones v. Toben, (2002) 71 A.L.D. 629 ("'We are not "holocaust deniers." We
proudly proclaim that to date there is no evidence that millions of people were killed in
homicidal gas chambers."' (quoting About the Adelaide Institute)).
120. See Arrest Warrant for Dr. Frederick Toben, Institute for Historical Review, at
http://www.ihr.org/other/990409warrant.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2005) (stating that German
authorities had downloaded the content from the Adelaide Institute's website and charging that
the content is in violation of the German Criminal Code) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
121. See id. (stating the facts on which Frederick Toben was arrested).
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could not reach Toben's website because the site was based in Australia.122
However, this determination was reversed on appeal, and Germany's High
Court, the Bundesgerichthof, ruled that "German authorities may take legal
action against foreigners who upload content that is illegal in Germany-even
though the Websites may be located elsewhere. ', 123 The outcome of this case
demonstrates that Germany views its jurisdiction broadly and will determine
jurisdiction based on where the content was viewed rather than on where it was
published or targeted.
2. Somm
The Somm case raised a similar question concerning liability for content
entering German borders from outside the country; however, Somm involved
the liability of an ISP for content stored on a server in a foreign country, rather
than the liability of the individual who posted the content. Felix Somm was an
executive of CompuServe Deutschland. 124 Somm was prosecuted by German
authorities for providing access to illegal pornographic material to CompuServe
subscribers, on the grounds that he should have filtered out the contents. 25
Although Somm was found guilty, his conviction was reversed on appeal. 26
The conviction was reversed because Somm was only the manager of a
subsidiary of CompuServe and did not have the power to block the content,127 a
necessary element required by Germany's Information and Communications
Services Act of 1997 in order to hold an ISP liable for content. 128 This case
adds to the rule of the Toben case: Although Germany will determine
jurisdiction based on where the content' is posted, Germany will not assign
liability to officers of foreign subsidiaries who have no control over the content.
122. See Weisman, supra note 117 (stating that a lower court ruled that only websites
based in Germany were liable).
123. Id.
124. Edmund Andrews, German Court Overturns Pornography Ruling Against
Compuserve, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1999, at C4.
125. See id. (stating that a Munich court sentenced Somm to two years probation and a fine
of 100,000 marks ($180,000) because CompuServe could have done more to block access to
illegal pornographic websites).
126. Id.
127. See id. (stating that the Bavarian court found Somm "a slave of the parent company"
and that he could not have done much more than he did to block the content).
128. See KIZZA, supra note 79, at 121 ("Service providers are not responsible for outside
content that they keep ready for usage without having an influence on it unless the content is
known to them and they have the technical capabilities to prevent its dissemination.").
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3. Yahoo!
ISP liability for content originating from the United States was also at
issue in Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme
(LICRA). 1 9 Two French student organizations, LICRA and UEJF, instituted
an action in French court against Yahoo! for violating a French law prohibiting
the offering for sale of Nazi merchandise. 130 Yahoo! offered the merchandise
for sale on its auction website. 131 The court issued an order requiring Yahoo! to
"eliminate French citizens' access to any material on the Yahoo.com auction
site that offers for sale any Nazi objects, relics, insignia, emblems, and flags."'
132
On a motion to reconsider the Order, the court affirmed its earlier judgment and
stated that although it is difficult to identify the national identity of the Internet
user, a combination of geographical identification of the IP address and
declaration of nationality would result in a filtering success rate of 90%. 133 The
court ordered that Yahoo! had three months to comply with the Order or it
would be subject to a penalty of 100,000 francs per day.1
34
In response to this Order, Yahoo! sought and received in U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California a declaratory judgment stating that
French authorities cannot impose and collect fines on Yahoo!.135 Before
deciding the merits of the case, the district court first concluded that it had
jurisdiction to hear the dispute based on the actions of LICRA in targeting
Yahoo!'s California headquarters with a cease and desist letter, effecting
129. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 379 F.3d 1120(9th
Cir. 2004).
130. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (stating that two French student unions filed a civil complaint
against Yahoo! alleging that Yahoo! violated French law), rev'd, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004).
131. See id. (finding that items for sale included Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf, The Protocol
of the Elders of Zion, and purported evidence that the gas chambers of the Holocaust did not
exist).
132. Id.
133. See La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme v. Yahoo!, Inc., T.G.I. Paris 14
(Nov. 20, 2000) ("The combination of two procedures, namely geographical identification of the
IP address and declaration of nationality, would be likely to achieve a filtering success rate
approaching 90%."), available at http://www.cdt.org/speech/intemational/001120yahoofrance.
pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
134. See id. at 20 ("We order YAHOO Inc. to comply within 3 months from notification of
the present order with the injunctions contained in our order of 22nd May 2000 subject to a
penalty of 100,000 Francs per day of delay effective from the first day following expiry of the 3
month period.").
135. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1194 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (granting Yahoo!'s motion for a declaratory judgment prohibiting
the enforcement of the French order against Yahoo!), rev'd, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004).
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service through the use of United States Marshals, and garnering a French
judgment that requires Yahoo! to perform specific physical acts in California.
136
In granting summary judgment for Yahoo!, the district court stated that the
enforcement of foreign judgments is based on the "comity of nations." 137 The
district court issued the declaratory judgment because the content is protected
by the First Amendment, and the court "may not enforce a foreign order that
violates the protections of the United States Constitution by chilling protected
speech that occurs simultaneously within our borders."'138 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit reversed and found that there was no basis for jurisdiction because
LICRA and UEJF had insufficient contacts with the forum state.'
39
In an amici curiae brief filed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit by the United States Chamber of Commerce and several industry
associations, an alterative reason for issuing the declaratory judgment was
offered: the lack of jurisdiction of the French court. 140 The lack of jurisdiction
argument was based on the notion that Yahoo! was an American company that
"provides Internet services in English, targeted at American citizens, from host
computers located in the United States.' 141 The brief pointed to decisions
holding that the maintenance of a passive website is not sufficient to meet the
requirements of the "minimum contacts" test forjurisdiction.142 The brief also
stated that requiring Internet users to search out laws of all foreign nations and
block illegal content from visibility in that nation is technologically impossible
136. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 145 F. Supp. 2d
1168, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (stating that LICRA sent a cease and desist letter to Yahoo!'s
California headquarters, requested that a French court require Yahoo! to perform specific
physical acts in Santa Clara, and effected service through United States Marshals, leading to
purposeful availment by LICRA of California laws).
137. See Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1192 ("The extent to which the United States, or any
state, honors the judicial decrees of foreign nations is a matter of choice, governed by 'the
comity of nations."' (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895))).
138. Id.
139. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 379 F.3d 1120, 1123
(9th Cir. 2004).
140. Brief Amici Curiae of Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al., Yahoo!, Inc.
v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, at 18 (9th Cir. 2002) (Case No. 01-17424)
[hereinafter Brief] (stating that the French court's judgment "is unenforceable for a second,
independent reason-the French court's expansive jurisdiction is inconsistent with due process
requirements"), available at http://www.cdt.org/jurisdiction/020507yahoo.pdf (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
141. Id. at 19-20.
142. See id. at 20 ("As this court has held, the maintenance of a passive website does not,
as a matter of law, demonstrate that the corporation has 'purposefully (albeit electronically)
directed his activity in a substantial way to the forum state."' (quoting Cybersell, Inc. v.
Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997)) (emphasis added by Brief)).
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and, even if possible, would be expensive to implement. 43  Given these
problems, the filers were troubled by the chilling effect that could result from
enforcement: "Faced with the fear of such prosecution, companies and
individuals would inevitably feel pressured to remove material that might be
unlawful in any jurisdiction, thus giving the most restrictive jurisdictions in the
world a de facto veto over the content available."' 44 The district court and the
Ninth Circuit did not reach this question because the case was decided on other
grounds. As a result, it is unclear to what extent lack of jurisdiction can act as
an alternative bar to enforcement.
After the decision by the district court, a second action was filed against
Yahoo! and its former Chief Executive Tim Koogle, charging that the sale of
Nazi memorabilia on Yahoo!'s website justified war crimes. 145 This action was
commenced by French Holocaust survivors. 46 However, Yahoo! was found
not guilty in this second suit. 47 The dismissal was not based on a finding of
lack of jurisdiction, but a failure to meet the merits. The French court said that
the auction pages on Yahoo!'s site did not meet the description of glorifying or
favorably presenting Nazi war crimes.'
48
F. The United States and the Protocol
Although the Council of Europe has made the Additional Protocol
available for the signature of the United States 49 and the United States has
143. See id. at 13-14 (stating that it is not technologically possible to identify with
certainty the geographic location of an Internet user, and even if it were, it is not economically
feasible for the vast majority of web publishers to deploy).
144. Id. at 11.
145. French Court Clears Yahoo in Nazi Case, SILCONVALLEY.cOM, at
http://www.siliconvalley.comlmldlsiliconvalley/newsleditoriall5156629.htm (Feb. 11, 2003)
(stating that plaintiffs accused Yahoo! of justifying war crimes and crimes against humanity) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
146. See id. (stating that this action was launched by French Holocaust survivors, who were
joined by a group called the Movement Against Racism and For Friendship Between People).
147. See id. (stating that the French court threw out the accusations leveled against
Yahoo!).
148. See id. ("But the Paris court said Tuesday that 'justifying war crimes' means
'glorifying, praising, or at least presenting the crimes in question favorably.' Yahoo and its
auction pages did not fit that description, the court said.").
149. See Additional Protocol, supra note 56, at 10 (providing in Article 9 that the protocol
is open for signature to all states that have signed the Convention).
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signed the underlying treaty, 50 the Bush Administration has indicated that the
United States will not become a party to the Additional Protocol. 15' A
Department of Justice spokesman said of the Additional Protocol: "The
important thing to realize is that the U.S. can't be a party to any convention that
abridges a constitutional protection."152 The decision of the United States to
refrain from signing the Additional Protocol is not surprising as the United
States had indicated that it would not have signed the underlying treaty if the
Internet hate speech language was included. 53 The Additional Protocol also
faced strong opposition from interest groups on both sides of the American
political spectrum, including the American Civil Liberties Union and the
Heritage Foundation.1
5 4
V. Enforcement of European Internet Hate Speech Laws Against United
States Internet Users and Providers
A. Hate Speech and the First Amendment
Although the United States has decided against signing the Protocol, the
Yahoo! case and the other cases mentioned above illustrate that this does not
necessarily mean that Europe will refrain from attempting to hold the United
States liable for hate speech posted from the United States. 55 Europe has a
150. See Council of Europe, Chart of Signatures and ratifications of a treaty, Europ. T.S.
No. 185, at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/searchsig.asp?NT=185&CM=8&DF=23/
11/03 (last visited Jan. 27, 2005) (showing that the United States signed the Convention on
Cybercrime on Nov. 23, 2001) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The
Convention on Cybercrime concerns copyright infringement, computer-related fraud, and child
pornography on the Internet. Convention on Cybercrime, Europ. T.S. No. 185 (Nov. 23, 2001),
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
151. See Declan McCullagh, U.S. Won't Support Net "Hate Speech" Ban, CNET
NEws.coM, at http://news.com.com/U.S.+won't+support+Net+%22hate+speech%22+ban/2100-
1023_3-965983.html (Nov. 15, 2002) (stating that the Bush Administration will not support the
Additional Protocol) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
152. Id.
153. See Madigan, supra note 55 ("The Council of Europe's original Convention on
Cybercrime in 2001 also contained a hate-speech measure, but it was dropped at the last minute
to gain support from the United States .... ").
154. See id. (quoting a Heritage Foundation fellow concerned about the vagueness of the
protocol); McCullagh, supra note 151 (quoting an American Civil Liberties Union director
applauding the decision of the United States not to sign the Additional Protocol).
155. See supra Part IV.E (discussing the prosecutions of Frederick Toben, Felix Somm,
and Yahoo! for content posted to the Internet outside the enforcing country).
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broad reading of its jurisdiction based on where the content was viewed. The
Yahoo! case demonstrates that the First Amendment can play an important role
in determining the enforceability of judgments against American users and
providers for hate speech content posted in America.156 Therefore, an overview
of the protections accorded to hate speech by the First Amendment is necessary.
In many cases, the First Amendment will decide the ability of a foreign nation
to enforce ajudgment in an American court. Generally, the First Amendment
protects hate speech from government regulation. Speech is subject to
proscription in some instances, but the contexts are limited. 157 In Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire,'58 the Supreme Court said that restrictions upon the content of
speech are allowed where the speech is "of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality." 159 For hate speech, there are two primary
tests for determining if the speech is proscribable: (1) if the speech presents a
true threat,'60 or (2) if the speech equates to "fighting words."' 61
156. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. LaLigue ContreLe Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (stating that the court "may not enforce a foreign order that
violates the protections of the United States Constitution by chilling protected speech that
occurs simultaneously within our borders"), rev'd, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004).
157. See Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, WORDS THAT WOUND:
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 17, 34-35 (Mai J.
Matsuda et al. eds., 1993) (stating that unprotected speech includes some false statements,
private facts about a private individual, defamatory speech, obscene speech, "fighting words,"
and "true threats").
158. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Chaplinsky was alleged to have
told the City Marshal that the Marshal was a "God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist
and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists." Id. at 569-70.
Chaplinsky was charged and convicted for violating a New Hampshire statute prohibiting any
person from addressing "any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is
lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name." Id.
at 569. The Supreme Court upheld the statute and Chaplinsky's conviction. Id. at 574. The
Court stated that the First Amendment does not protect "fighting" words that "by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id. at 572. The
Court upheld the statute because it was "narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish
specific conduct lying within the domain of state power, the use in a public place of words likely
to cause a breach of the peace." Id. at 573.
159. Id. at 572.
160. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the First
Amendment protects speech that advocates violence, so long as the speech is not directed to
inciting or promoting lawless action and is not likely to incite or produce such action); see also
Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d
1058, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the posting of names and addresses of abortion
providers on a website of anti-abortion organization constituted a "true threat" and was not
entitled to First Amendment protection).
161. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574 (upholding conviction under a New Hampshire
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The "true threat" test was established in Brandenburg v. Ohio.'6 2 The
Brandenburg test states that the "constitutional guarantees of free speech and
free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action."' 163 The Supreme Court held that a Ku Klux Klan meeting involving the
burning of a cross, derogatory comments about Negroes and Jews, and the
presence of weaponry was not sufficient to rise to the level of inciting
"imminent lawless action" because it was "mere advocacy," and reversed the
conviction on First Amendment grounds.164
The Brandenburg test faces questionable application to the Internet, as the
Internet's impersonal contact cannot be seen as readily meeting the "true threat"
requirement of being likely to incite "imminent lawless action." 165 The first real
application of the "true threat" test to the Internet was in Planned Parenthood
of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists.166 The
statute that made it a crime to use in a public place words likely to cause a breach of peace). But
see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding unconstitutional a Minnesota
ordinance that prohibited the display of a symbol that one knows or has reason to know "arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender").
162. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445-49 (1969) (reversing the conviction of a
KKK rally organizer because the statute he was convicted under purported to proscribe mere
advocacy of speech, which is protected by the First Amendment). In Brandenburg, the
defendant was convicted for violating the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute for
"advocat[ing] ... the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful
methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform" and for
"voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or
advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." Id. at 444--45. The defendant was identified
by videotapes as a speaker at a KKK rally, at which KKK members were gathered around a
wooden cross, that they burned, made derogatory statements about Negroes and Jews, and
carried weapons. Id. at 445-47. The Supreme Court held the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism
Statute unconstitutional. Id. at 449. The statute purported "to punish mere advocacy and to
forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the described
type of action," and did not distinguish between mere advocacy and incitement to imminent
lawless action. Id. at 448-49. Advocacy of the use of force can only be proscribed "where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action." Id. at 447. Because the Ohio statute failed to make this distinction, it was
ruled unconstitutional. Id. at 449.
163. ld. at 447.
164. Id. at 449.
165. See Yulia A. Timofeeva, Hate Speech Online: Restricted or Protected? Comparison
of Regulations in the United States and Germany, 12 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 253, 273
(2003) ("Indeed, it does not seem highly probable that impersonal, or even personal messages
on the computer screen would directly cause someone to get involved in violence or disorder.").
166. Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists,
290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). The ACLA published "Deadly Dozen" posters containing
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American Coalition of Life Activists (ACLA) published posters and also
provided the names and locations of abortion providers to a website (the
"Nuremberg Files").' 67 After being featured on posters, three abortion
providers were murdered. 168 On the website, the names of abortion providers
who had been murdered were lined through in black, and names of those who
had been wounded were lined through in gray. 169 Given the context of the
posters and the Files, the Ninth Circuit held that the Nuremberg Files
constituted a "true threat" because the defendants knew that the doctors would
feel threatened by them.17 As a result, the content was not protected by the
First Amendment.'
7 '
In addition to "true threats," "fighting words" are also proscribable and are
not protected speech. In Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court defined "fighting
information on physicians who perform abortions. Id. at 1064-65. The ACLA also published
on its website the "Nuremberg Files," containing the names of 200 physicians and 200 judges,
politicians, law enforcement officers, spouses, and abortion rights supporters. Id. at 1065. The
"Nuremberg Files" crossed out in black the names of abortion providers who had been
murdered, and lined through in gray those who had been wounded. Id. at 1080. Dr. David
Gunn, Dr. George Patterson, and Dr. John Bayard Britton had been shot after posters containing
their name and workplace had been circulated. Id. at 1063-64. Physicians brought suit against
the ACLA under the Freedom of Access to Clinics Entrances Act (FACE), 18 U.S.C. § 248,
which provides aggrieved persons a right of action against whoever by "threat of force...
intentionally... intimidates ... any person because that person is or has been... providing
reproductive health services." Id. at 1062. ACLA argued that the poster and the Nuremberg
Files were protected political speech, and were not "true threats." Id. at 1072. The Ninth
Circuit applied a "reasonable speaker" true threat test to determine the definition of "threat of
force" under FACE: [W]hether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be
interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of
intent to harm or assault." Id. at 1074. The court concluded that the posters were not just
political statements, even if the first couple of posters were purely political messages; "the
poster format itself had acquired currency as a death threat for abortion providers." Id. at 1079.
As a result, the court held that the use of the posters and the listing in the Nuremberg Files
constituted a "true threat." Id. at 1088. However, the Nuremberg Files still constitute
"protected speech" and personal information may only not be used "with the specific intent to
threaten" the physicians. Id.
167. See id. at 1064-65 (stating that the ACLA published a "Deadly Dozen" poster listing
the names and offices of a dozen abortion providers, and provided information on abortion
providers to a website hosting the names of abortion providers).
168. See id. at 1063-64 (stating that Dr. David Gunn, Dr. George Patterson, and Dr. John
Bayard Britton had all been shot and killed after appearing on posters).
169. See id. at 1080 ("[N]ames of abortion providers who have been murdered because of
their activities are lined through in black, while names of those who have been wounded are
highlighted in grey.").
170. See id. at 1088 (stating that the posters and the "Nuremberg Files" constitute true
threats, and the ACLA realized that the posters had a threatening meaning that physicians would
take seriously).
171. See id. at 1086 ("Like 'fighting words,' true threats are proscribable.").
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words" as words that by their very utterance "inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace." 172 The Supreme Court has recently fleshed out
this doctrine in R.A. V. v. City of Saint Paul,173 which held unconstitutional a
Saint Paul ordinance that criminalized "plac[ing] on public or private property a
symbol... including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika,
which one knows or has reason to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender. " 74 The Court said
that even if the statute only reached speech proscribable under the "fighting
words" doctrine, it was still unconstitutional because it prohibited speech based
purely on the basis of the subjects the speech addressed. 175 The statute only
criminalized "fighting words" on the basis of "race, color, creed, religion, or
gender," and permitted the use of "fighting words" on every other subject.
176
As a result, the statute created "the possibility that the city is seeking to
handicap the expression of particular ideas.'
77
172. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
173. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). Petitioner, R.A.V., allegedly
assembled a cross and burned the cross inside the fenced yard of a neighbor who lived across
the street from R.A.V. Id. at 379. Petitioner was charged for violating a Saint Paul ordinance
that provides that it is disorderly conduct to "place[ ] on public or private property a symbol...
including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reason
to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion
or gender." Id at 380. Petitioner moved "to dismiss this count on the ground that the Saint Paul
ordinance was substantially overbroad and impermissibly content based and therefore facially
invalid under the First Amendment." Id. The trial court granted this motion, but the Minnesota
Supreme Court reversed. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court said that the statute was not
overbroad because it was limited to content that is proscribable under the Chaplinsky "fighting
words" doctrine. Id. Further, the Minnesota Supreme Court said that the statute was not
impermissibly content-based because it was narrowly tailored. Id. at 381. The United States
Supreme Court reversed the determination of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Id. For its review,
the Court assumed that the only content the statute could reach was content proscribable as
"fighting words" under the Chaplinsky formulation. Id. However, the Court held that the
statute was impermissibly content-based because it prohibited speech purely on the basis of the
subjects the speech addresses. Id. Although the statute prohibited "fighting words" on the basis
of "race, color, creed, religion, or gender," it did not reach political affiliation, union
membership, or homosexuality. Id. at 391. The Court said that the "First Amendment does not
permit Saint Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on
disfavored subjects." Id.
174. Id. at 380.
175. See id. at 381 ("Assuming, arguendo, that all of the expression reached by the
ordinance is proscribable under the 'fighting words' doctrine, we nonetheless conclude that the
ordinance is facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on
the basis of the subjects the speech addresses.").
176. See id. at 391 ("Those who wish to use 'fighting words' in connection with other
ideas-to express hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union membership,
or homosexuality-are not covered.").
177. Id. at 394.
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The Court did say that Saint Paul could prohibit cross burning consistent
with the First Amendment; the city just failed to do so in that case.'78 Another
attempt to prohibit cross burning was found unconstitutional in Virginia v.
Black.'79 Although R.A.V. is a "fighting words" case, Virginia v. Black is a
"true threat" case.1 80 Unlike the ordinance in R.A.V., Virginia's cross burning
statute did not single out any particular individual or group;' 8' instead, it
generally provided that it "shall be unlawful for any person or group of persons,
to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or
other public place."' 82  Given the history of cross burnings as a form of
intimidation, the Court said that it was consistent for Virginia to outlaw cross
burnings done with the intent to intimidate, as it met the "true threat"
threshold. 183 However, the Court held the statute unconstitutional because it
provided that any burning of a cross constituted "prima facie evidence of an
intent to intimidate."' 84 The Court stated that the history of cross burnings
indicates that a burning cross is "not always intended to intimidate,"' 85 and the
178. See id. at 396 ("St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior
without adding the First Amendment to the fire.").
179. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). Defendants were convicted separately for
violating Virginia's cross-burning statute, which provides that it is unlawful for any person
"with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to bum, or cause to be burned, a
cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place." Id. at 348. The statute
further provides that any "such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to
intimidate a person or group of persons." Id. The Supreme Court held that it is consistent with
the First Amendment for a state to ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate.
Id. at 363. However, by making the burning of a cross prima facie evidence of intent to
intimidate, the statute crossed the line between what may be proscribable threatening speech,
and what is merely core political speech. Id. at 365-66. Even though a cross burning at a
political rally may arouse anger in a vast majority of citizens, that is not sufficient to ban all
cross burnings. Id. at 366. Because the statute fails to distinguish between cross burnings
directed at an individual from cross burning directed at a group of like-minded believers, the
statute was ruled unconstitutional. Id. at 365-66.
180. See id. at 360 (stating that intimidation is a type of "true threat" and that respondents
do not contest that some cross burnings fit within this meaning of intimidating speech).
181. See id. at 362 ("Unlike the statute at issue in R.A.V., the Virginia statute does not
single out for opprobrium only that speech directed toward 'one of the specified disfavored
topics.'").
182. Id. at 348.
183. See id. at 363 ("Instead of prohibiting all intimidating messages, Virginia may choose
to regulate this subset of intimidating messages in light of cross burning's long and pernicious
history as a signal of impending violence.").
184. See id. at 367 ("For these reasons, the prima facie evidence provision, as interpreted
through the jury instruction and as applied in Barry Black's case, is unconstitutional on its
face.").
185. Id. at 365.
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statute failed to distinguish between "a cross burning at a public rally or a cross
burning on a neighbor's lawn., 186 The prima facie evidence provision, the
Court stated, "ignores all of the contextual factors that are necessary to decide
whether a particular cross burning is intended to intimidate."'1 87 In order to be a
"true threat," there must be intent to intimidate, and the prima facie evidence
provision constituted an impermissible shortcut.
88
One could argue that Black backtracks from the Court's opinion in R.A. V.
that the First Amendment cannot be proscribed based on the content of the
speech. The prohibition on cross burnings seems aimed particularly at cross
burnings done with a racial animus. However, the Court does distinguish the
two statutes, likely preserving the R.A. V. rule. Justice O'Connor distinguished
the Virginia statute from the St. Paul ordinance by saying that in the Virginia
statute, "[i]t does not matter whether an individual bums a cross with intent to
intimidate because of the victim's race, gender, or religion, or because of the
victim's 'political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality.'" 89 As a
result, the statute did not result in a targeted prohibition because it targeted all
cross burnings and not just those directed to intimidate a particular group, and
the Court cited a few cases where cross burnings were intended to intimidate
but were not done with a racial animus. This distinction seems to indicate
that the Court is not backtracking on its statement in R.A.V. that the First
Amendment does not allow the government to proscribe speech on the basis of
the subject of the speech.
B. The Protocol and the First Amendment
The preceding cases demonstrate that for the United States to proscribe
hate speech, the United States must meet the high burden required by the tests
for "true threat" or for "fighting words." Even though the United States has
stated it will not enact the Protocol, the constitutionality of the provisions will
affect the ability of a party to enforce its hate speech legislation in American
186. Id. at 366.
187. Id. at 367.
188. See id. ("The First Amendment does not permit such a shortcut.").
189. Id. at 362 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)).
190. See id. at 362-63 (noting instances of cross burnings directed at union members, the
case of a defendant who burned a cross in the yard of a lawyer who had previously represented
him and who was currently prosecuting him, and the case of defendants who burned a cross in a
neighbor's yard possibly because they were angry that their neighbor had complained about the
presence of a firearm shooting range in defendants' yard).
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courts. 19 1 As a result, an analysis of the constitutionality of each of the
provisions of the Protocol is necessary. Given the high burden set by the Court,
if the United States were to enact the Protocol, most of the provisions of the
Protocol would likely be held unconstitutional.
Article 3 of the Protocol requires each party to criminalize "distributing, or
otherwise making available, racist and xenophobic material to the public
through a computer system.' 192 This Article does not distinguish between
purely political speech and speech intended to intimidate, so it would not meet
the constitutional requirements of a "true threat." This statute is analogous to
the statute ruled unconstitutional in Black: Like Virginia placed a blanket
prohibition on cross burning, 193 the Council of Europe is placing a blanket
prohibition on distribution of racist and xenophobic materials. The Virginia
statute failed to distinguish between cross burnings at a political rally for the
benefit of like-minded individuals and a cross burning on a neighbor's lawn.
194
The Council of Europe has failed to distinguish between racist and xenophobic
materials directed to other racists and xenophobes and material intended to
intimidate. As a result, this Article will not meet the "true threat" test.
Article 3 also will not meet the requirements of the "fighting words" test.
Chaplinsky limits the "fighting words" doctrine to those words that "by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace." 95 It is doubtful the mere distribution of racist material over the Internet
will result in an "immediate breach of the peace.' 96 However, even if it is
accepted that the distribution of racist and xenophobic material on the Internet
would cause an "immediate breach of the peace," the Article would run into the
R.A. V. problem of singling out certain speech for criminalization. The Protocol
only criminalizes racist and xenophobic speech, which is similar to how the
191. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (issuing a declaratory judgment that a French order requiring
Yahoo! to disable French access to auctions of Nazi memorabilia is unenforceable in the United
States because of the protections afforded speech by the First Amendment), rev'd, 379 F.3d
1120 (9th Cir. 2004).
192. Additional Protocol, supra note 56, at 8.
193. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343,348 (2003) ("It shall be unlawful for any person
or persons, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to
be burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place.").
194. See id. at 366 ("It does not distinguish between a cross burning at a public rally or a
cross burning on a neighbor's lawn. It does not treat the cross burning directed at an individual
differently from the cross burning directed at a group of like-minded believers.").
195. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
196. See Timofeeva, supra note 165, at 272 ("Indeed, it does not seem highly probable that
impersonal, or even personal messages on the computer screen would directly cause someone to
get involved in violence or disorder.").
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Saint Paul ordinance only criminalizes the posting of symbols likely to arouse
anger on the basis of "race, color, creed, religion or gender."'197 The Saint Paul
ordinance was held unconstitutional on this basis because the First Amendment
"does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who
express views on disfavored subjects."' 198 Given this precedent, even if the
Protocol were found to criminalize only conduct rising to the level of "fighting
words," it will be held unconstitutional because it only criminalizes speech
concerning certain disfavored subjects.
A similar analysis would lead to the unconstitutionality of Article 6, which
criminalizes the denial or minimization of a genocide. 99 The denial of
genocide is not likely to result in intimidation, and, even if it does, the statute
does not distinguish between denials of genocide intended to intimidate and
denials not intended to intimidate. As a result, it is not likely to meet the Black
"true threat" test. The Article does allow a country to reserve the right to
require that the denial be accompanied by "intent to incite hatred,
discrimination or violence against any individual or group. "200 However, even
with a requirement of intent, this Article is still likely to be found
unconstitutional under a "true threat" analysis. The reservation still requires
criminalization of intent to incite hatred and discrimination, which are not true
threats-only intent to incite violence is a true threat.20 1 Even if it can be
assumed that denials of genocide are likely to lead to an "immediate breach of
peace" under the "fighting words" analysis and the other problems did not exist,
this Article still would be unconstitutional because it is singling out a particular
viewpoint for criminalization. The Article states that only denials of genocide
are to be criminalized under the Protocol, so it is criminalizing a "disfavored
subject" based on the speaker's viewpoint, which is unconstitutional under
R.A. V. 
202
Article 5, criminalizing the act of publicly insulting a person for the reason
that they belong to a group distinguished by race, is also likely to be
197. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379 (1992).
198. Id. at 391.
199. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (stating that Article 6 requires each
party to criminalize the denial or minimization of a genocide, unless the party reserves the right
not to apply this Article).
200. Additional Protocol, supra note 56, at 10.
201. See Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists,
290 F.3d 1058, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that the Nuremberg Files are only unprotected to
the extent physicians are threatened with being next on a hit list).
202. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) ("The First Amendment does




unconstitutional. °3 Insulting someone in public is likely to result in an
"immediate breach of the peace," which would make it a candidate for
proscription under Chaplinsky.2°4 However, the Internet involves less reason
for thinking that a public insult would lead to an immediate breach of the
peace, so it is doubtful this would rise to the level of "fighting words" in the
context of the Internet. °5 Even if it did rise to the level of "fighting words,"
this Article would be unconstitutional because it impermissibly concerns the
subject of the speech. In R.A. V., the Supreme Court assumed that the ordinance
only reached conduct proscribable as "fighting words," but held the ordinance
unconstitutional because it only criminalized conduct likely to arouse anger on
the basis of "race, color, creed, religion or gender., 20 6 Similarly, the Protocol
only criminalizes publicly insulting someone on the basis of the person's "race,
colour, descent or national or ethnic origin." 20 7 Because the Article singles out
for punishment those speakers who "express views on disfavored subjects," it
will likely be found unconstitutional.20 8
The Article that comes the closest to being constitutional is Article 4,
which requires parties to criminalize "threatening.. .with the commission of a
serious criminal offense... (i) persons for the reason that they belong to a
group, distinguished by race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin.., or
(ii) a group of persons which is distinguished by any of these characteristics." 209
This Article seems to make the necessary distinction between speech likely to
result in "imminent lawless action" and speech not likely to result in such action
because it is limited only to cases where a person threatened another person
with the "commission of a serious criminal offense." As a result, the conduct
described in this Article appears to be proscribable as a true threat. However,
even though it is proscribable conduct, the statute is likely to fail the First
203. See Additional Protocol, supra note 56, at 4 (requiring parties to adopt measures
criminalizing "insulting publicly.., persons for the reason that they belong to a group
distinguished by race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin").
204. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569,573 (1942) (holding that it is
constitutional for New Hampshire to criminalize addressing any offensive word to any other
person in a public place because it is likely to result in an "immediate breach of the peace").
205. See Timofeeva, supra note 165, at 272 ("Indeed, it does not seem highly probable that
impersonal, or even personal messages on the computer screen would directly cause someone to
get involved in violence or disorder.").
206. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380, 396 (1992) (holding the St. Paul
ordinance unconstitutional).
207. Additional Protocol, supra note 56, at 5.
208. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391 ("The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to
impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects.").
209. Additional Protocol, supra note 56, at 9.
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Amendment analysis because it violates the R.A. V. rule that it is impermissible
to proscribe speech based on the subject of the speech. The Protocol only
targets true threats where the threat was instigated because of the person's
"race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin," making it a regulation of the
basis of speech, and not a regulation based on the conduct or effect of the
speech. One could argue that, in Black, the Supreme Court became more
receptive to regulation based on the subject of the speech, but the statutes
appear to be distinguishable enough to the point where R.A. V. remains good
law.
210
C. Enforcement of Criminal Liability
The First Amendment analysis demonstrates that each of the provisions of
the Protocol would likely be found unconstitutional under American law if the
United States adopted these provisions, with the possible exception of Article
4's true threat provisions. However, the United States has indicated that it will
not sign the Protocol, so a legislative enactment is not presently at issue.2 '
Instead, the First Amendment jurisprudence provides insight into the
enforceability of European judgments in American courts. Because of the
protections the First Amendment accords speech, it is doubtful the European
nations that enact the Protocol will be able to reach most hate speech posted
from the United States.
American Internet users who post hate speech on the Internet generally do
not need to worry about criminal liability unless they engage in foreign travel.
As the Toben case illustrates, European courts view their jurisdiction broadly,
and hold users who post speech on the Internet liable under their nations' law,
212even if the content is uploaded to the Internet from outside their nations.
However, Toben made the mistake of visiting Germany and was arrested while
on German soil.2 13 For a criminal trial, the defendant generally must be
present. 214 If Toben never visited Germany, in order for Germany to press
210. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text (analyzing the differences between
the statutes at issue in R.A. V. and in Black).
211. See McCullagh, supra note 151 (stating that the Bush Administration will not support
the additional protocol).
212. See supra Part IV.E. I (concerning the criminal prosecution by Germany of Frederick
Toben).
213. See Matthew Abraham, History's Rewriter Faces German Jail, THE AUSTRALIAN, July
8, 1999, at 4 (stating that Toben was arrested while making a visit to the local prosecutor's
office to discuss his Holocaust research).
214. See DADAMO & FARRAN, supra note 92, at 193 ("Moreover, unlike in a civil trial, the
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criminal charges against Toben, the prosecutors would have needed to extradite
Toben from Australia to Germany.
Extradition in the United States is governed by treaties; the United States
cannot seize a fugitive criminal and surrender him to a foreign power in the
215absence of a treaty. Extradition treaties are either multilateral or bilateral. An
example of a multilateral extradition treaty would be the underlying Convention
on Cybercrime' s extradition provisions.216 However, a party to the Convention
on Cybercrime is not obligated to extradite defendants sought for prosecution
for violating provisions of the Additional Protocol,217 and there are no other
multilateral treaties on point.218  Therefore, a country seeking a fugitive
defendant from the United States would need to rely on its bilateral treaty with
the United States.
The United States does not have any bilateral extradition treaties with
European nations that would obligate it to hand over defendants to be charged
in connection with the posting of hate speech on the Internet. The United
States' bilateral extradition treaty with Germany contains a list of thirty-three
extraditable offenses, and, additionally, provides for extradition for any offense
not listed, provided it is punishable under the federal laws of the United States
and Germany. 219 The posting of hate speech on the Internet neither falls within
any of the listed extraditable offenses, nor is it a crime punishable under the
federal laws of the United States, so it would not be an extraditable offense.
defendant must be personally present at his trial before a criminal court... and cannot be
simply represented as in civil proceedings.").
215. See Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936) ("[Iln the
absence of a conventional or legislative provision, there is no authority vested in any department
of the government to seize a fugitive criminal and surrender him to a foreign power."); M.
CHERIFBASSOUINI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 36 (4th
ed. 2002) ("[T]he United States requires a treaty, as does the United Kingdom and most
common law countries.").
216. See Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, art. 24, Europ. T.S. No. 185
(providing in Article 24 for extradition for crimes established by the Convention), available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
217. See id. (stating that the extradition provisions of the Convention on Cybercrime only
concern criminal offenses established in accordance with Articles 2-11 of the Convention); see
also Additional Protocol, supra note 56 (stating in Article 8 that the scope of application of
measures defined in Article 24 is extended to signatories of the Additional Protocol).
218. See BASSOUINI, supra note 215, at 913-23 (listing multilateral conventions containing
provisions on extradition).
219. See Extradition, Jun. 20, 1978, U.S.-F.R.G., art. 2, 32 U.S.T. 1485, 1489 (providing
extradition for offenses described in the Appendix to the treaty, and for offenses, whether listed
in the Appendix or not, provided they are punishable under the laws of the United States and the
laws of the Federal Republic of Germany).
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The extradition treaty of the United States with France has similar language to
the treaty with Germany, with a list of extraditable offenses, on the condition
that acts are punished as crimes or offenses by the laws of both States. 220 As a
result, just like with Germany, the United States cannot extradite an individual
to France for posting hate speech on the Internet.
The other extradition treaties of the United States with European nations
contain similar language.2 1  Because there are no treaties providing for
extradition by the United States of individuals sought for criminal prosecution
for posting hate speech on the Internet, the prosecuting country will be unable
to extradite the offender from the United States. This bars criminal prosecution
unless, like Toben, the defendant engages in foreign travel.
Although the individual poster of the content would need to engage in
foreign travel, an ISP may have an office or subdivision in the country that is
charging the defendant for the conduct. However, the Somm case demonstrates
that liability is not likely to be imposed on corporate subdivisions for conduct
of the parent company. Because the German subdivision in that case had no
control over servers located in America, the charges were dismissed against
Felix Somm. 222 If courts follow this precedent, no liability is likely to be
imposed on American ISPs or their foreign subdivisions for content posted on
American servers.
D. Enforcement of Civil Liability
Although the defendant must be present for a criminal trial, no presence is
required for a civil trial. If the defendant is not present, a court is likely to issue
a default judgment against an Internet user who posts hate speech on the
Internet once the judge determines that the claim is admissible and well
founded.223 However, this judgment will be helpful to the enforcing country
only if the defendant has assets in the country issuing the default judgment.
224
220. See Extradition, Feb. 12, 1970, U.S.-Fr., art. 2, 22 U.S.T. 407, 409 (providing that
extradition shall be granted for certain acts if they are punished as crimes or offenses by the laws
of both countries).
221. See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1220 ("A pervasive feature of modem extradition
treaties is the principle of double criminality. This principle requires that the charged offense be
criminal in both the requesting and the requested jurisdictions.").
222. See supra Part IV.E.2 (stating that Felix Somm's conviction was reversed on appeal
because he had no control over content posted on American servers).
223. See DADAMo & FAnRRAN, supra note 92, at 178 ("A judgment may be entered in the
absence of the defendant once the judge has ensured that the claim is admissible and well
founded.").
224. See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1217 (stating that the defendant's physical presence or
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Otherwise, the issuing country would need to attempt to enforce the judgment
in the United States, if all the assets of the defendant are located there.
If a country seeks to enforce a civil judgment in an American court against
an individual who posts hate speech on the Internet, a court is likely to refuse to
enforce the judgment. Enforcement of foreign judgments is based on comity.225
However, the outcome would likely be the same as that reached in the Yahoo!
case. The First Amendment protections accorded free speech will likely be
enough to prevent enforcement of foreign civil judgments in American
courts.226 However, it is questionable whether the First Amendment protects all
of the provisions of the Protocol-particularly Article 4's true threat provisions.
Even if a court were to find that the true threat on the basis of race is
proscribable based on Black, the court may still fall back on the second reason
offered by the amici curiae in the Yahoo! case: The foreign court has no
jurisdiction over a web site posted in the United States and targeted at
American Internet users.227 In the United States, the mere passive presence of a
website as viewable in another jurisdiction will not be enough for a court to
228
allow jurisdiction. For jurisdiction, American courts generally require that
the website target the forum or that the website is highly interactive. 229 Because
presence is not sufficient, unless one of these other requirements is met, even if
the content is proscribable, the judgment is still unlikely to be enforced because
assets within the territory remains the primary basis for a nation or state to enforce its laws, and
that the large majority of persons who transact in cyberspace have no presence or assets in the
jurisdictions that wish to regulate their information flows in cyberspace).
225. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2001) ("The extent to which the United States, or any state, honors the
judicial decrees of foreign nations is a matter of choice, governed by 'the comity of nations."'
(quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895))), rev'd, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004).
226. See id. at 1193 ("Absent a body of law that establishes international standards with
respect to speech on the Internet and an appropriate treaty or legislation addressing enforcement
of such standards to speech originating within the United States, the principle of comity is
outweighed by the Court's obligation to uphold the First Amendment.").
227. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text (concerning the alternative argument
promoted by the amici curiae for granting Yahoo! the declaratory judgment: The lack of
jurisdiction of the French court).
228. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
1997) ("A passive Website that does little more than make information available to those who
are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise [of) personal jurisdiction.").
229. See id. at 1126-27 (holding that the Pennsylvania court has jurisdiction over a case
filed against a California website, after finding that the website is highly interactive, has
subscribers in Pennsylvania, has contracts with Internet-access providers to furnish its services
to customers in Pennsylvania, and the harm occurred in Pennsylvania). But see Hy Cite Corp. v.
Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1158-67 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (rejecting
the sliding scale of website interactivity approach adopted in Zippo, and instead applying
traditional jurisdiction tests).
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of the lack of jurisdiction of the foreign court. As a result, given the protections
accorded free speech by the First Amendment and America's requirements for
establishing personal jurisdiction, it is doubtful that a foreign judgment
would be enforceable in an American court against an individual who posts
hate speech on the Internet from America.
If the person posting the hate speech is not a unique individual, but
instead a corporation or an ISP, the same analysis would apply. Although the
foreign court would likely find jurisdiction to hear the case and issue a
judgment, unless the corporation has foreign assets available, the judgment
would need to be enforced in an American court, and the outcome would be
the same as in the Yahoo! case.2 The American court would find the
judgment contrary to the First Amendment or would find that the foreign
court has no jurisdiction over the matter.23'
E. Effect of Inability of European Laws To Reach American Conduct
As European countries are unable to extradite American offenders and
are not able to enforce civil judgments in American courts, the posting of
hate speech from American servers will go largely unpunished. The effect of
the protections accorded racist speech by American laws will be that America
will become a haven for hate speech. An American haven can take two
possible forms: (1) no foreign web sites will come to America, but American
web sites will provide a leak to European web users; or (2) European
webmasters, fearing liability for posting hate speech in Europe, will be
attracted to America. If the former occurs, America will not face a policy
problem, as it will not result in an escalation of hate speech taking place on
its territory. However, if the latter occurs, more hate-speakers will come to
America, which could create a potential policy problem for America.
America does act as a leak of hate speech to the world: Before the
Protocol, it was already the case that most hate sites on the Internet were
232based in America. This number largely represents sites, such as
230. See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1217 ("A defendant's physical presence or assets
within the territory remains the primary basis for a nation or state to enforce its laws.").
231. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2001) ("Absent a body of law that establishes international standards
with respect to speech on the Internet and an appropriate treaty or legislation addressing
enforcement of such standards to speech originating within the United States, the principle of
comity is outweighed by the Court's obligation to uphold the First Amendment."), rev'd, 379
F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004).
232. See Scheeres, supra note 11 (stating that, according to a Council of Europe report,
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Stormfront.org,233 that target an American audience. However, the number
also includes sites that have moved to America in response to hate speech
legislation in other countries: Reports indicate that Germany's actions
against hate speech led many hate groups to transfer their sites from Germany
to the United States.234 As a result, it appears that an American haven does
have the effect of causing some hate-speakers to move their sites to America
to take advantage of America's protection of free speech.
If the trend of transferring sites from European countries to the United
States continues, with a greater crackdown on racist sites in Europe, more of
these websites will likely flee to the United States. Given the protections
accorded hate speech by the First Amendment, the United States will have no
constitutional way to combat them. This may or may not pose a policy
problem for the United States. If the speakers are merely utilizing American
servers, and otherwise maintaining their presence in foreign territory, then the
site will have minimal effect on American culture. The greatest effect would
be greater animosity toward the United States from countries that have
criminalized the content and are seeking to remove such content from the
Internet. However, if these individuals continue to maintain presence outside
the United States, then foreign countries would be able to assert jurisdiction
over these individuals based on presence even if the website is not located in
the enforcing country.235
But if the transference of websites to the United States alone proves
insufficient to protect speakers of hate from liability under the growing global
framework against hate speech, then the speakers may take the next logical
step-transference of their presence to the United States. Although the
United States has a rich tradition for the protection of free speech and the
welcoming of different ideological viewpoints, the transference of presence
could pose a policy problem for the United States. An influx of hate speakers
into the United States would likely result in an increase of hate groups in the
United States, which would have the effect of increasing racial tension. As a
2500 out of 4000 racist websites were created in the United States).
233. Stormfront, at http://www.stormfront.org (last visited Jan. 27,2005) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
234. See Agence-France Press, Neo-Nazi Web Sites Reported to Flee Germany, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 2000, at A5 ("In a report on neo-Nazi activities, [N.D.R.] radio said that around
90 rightist groups had transferred their sites to the United States ....").
235. See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1216-17 (stating that a nation can enforce its laws
against a person with physical presence or assets within the territory).
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result, steps consistent with the Constitution may be necessary to help
prevent the United States from becoming a haven for Internet hate speech.
VI. Ways To Mitigate the United States as a Haven for
Internet Hate Speech
Although the Protocol will be largely ineffective against hate speech
originating in America and the First Amendment prevents America from
joining in the Protocol, there are several policy alternatives available to
policymakers that could mitigate the ability of the United States to act as a
haven for Internet hate speech. These policies include steps Europe can take to
clog the American leak, and steps America can implement to prevent an
236escalation of racist speech.
A. European ISPs Blocking Foreign Hate Speech Sites
European nations can adopt the approach that Spain has taken with
American websites. Spain has passed a law authorizing judges to order the
blocking of websites that do not comply with national law. 237 The increasing
use of blocking software may lead some racist speakers to determine that
setting up a racist website in the United States is not worth the effort if the site
will not be available around the globe. However, as stated above, this approach
can be problematic. Namely, it is onerous on the victimized country because it
238forces the victimized country to search out the illegal content. As a result,
this approach may not be effective in deterring the content from being placed
on the Internet in the first place.
236. In addition to the policy proposals suggested below, there are also means users can
take to block hate speech from their computers. The Anti-Defamation League has developed a
free filter available for download, which blocks websites of those organizations which, in the
judgment of the Anti-Defamation League, advocate hatred, bigotry, or violence towards Jews or
other groups on the basis of their religion, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or other
characteristics. For more information on the Anti-Defamation League's HateFilter, see
http://www.adl.org/hatefilter/default.asp.
237. See Scheeres, supra note 11 ("Spain recently passed legislation authorizing judges to
shut down Spanish sites and block access to U.S. Web pages that don't comply with national
laws.").
238. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (stating that the Spanish law does not place
a deterrent on the producer of the content to not put the content on the Internet on the first
place).
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B. Increased Cooperation by American ISPs Against Hate Speech
European countries can also increase dialogue with American ISPs and try
to create voluntary agreements for the suppression of hate speech. Even though
the United States government cannot proscribe most hate speech, the First
Amendment does not require a private party to publish and make available the
speech. 239 As a result, ISPs are able to restrict the speech published on their
websites. In recognizing the limitations the Protocol would have in reaching
conduct originating in the United States, the European Commission on Racism
and Intolerance endorsed this approach.24 ISPs have indicated a willingness to
cooperate on this front: In the wake of the French actions against Yahoo!,
Yahoo! announced that it would ban auctions of Nazi artifacts on its site.
241
However, the cooperation of ISPs would only be successful to the extent the
websites in question do not maintain their own server. Even if they are not on
their own server, this may only just lead to displacement of hate speech, with
speakers leaving censored servers and placing their content on uncensored
servers.
C. Extradition Treaty
Another policy solution would be for the United States to enter into a
242
treaty providing for the extradition of speakers of hate speech. However, this
approach is unlikely to pass constitutional muster under the current framework
proposed by the Council of Europe. Extradition must be done by treaty.24' A
239. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976) (holding that striking union
members have no First Amendment right to enter a mall for the purpose of advertising their
strike against one of the stores therein because a mall is not a state actor).
240. See LEGAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 24, at 90 ("The prudent course, therefore, would
be to enter into a dialogue with all service providers, in particular the Americans, in order to
convince them that they themselves must take the appropriate measures to combat racist sites
(by blocking sites, filtering, refusing anonymity to authors of sites, etc.).").
241. See Lori Enos, Yahoo! to Ban Nazi-Related Auctions, E-COMMERCE TIMES,
http://www.ecommercetimes.comi/perl/story/6432.html (Jan. 3,2001) ("Responding to pressure
from anti-hate groups and concerned users, Yahoo! announced ... it will ban auctions of Nazi
artifacts and other items 'that are associated with groups which promote or glorify hatred and
violence.') (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
242. See Alexander Tsesis, Prohibiting Incitement on the Internet, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5,
89 (2002) (proposing an extradition treaty as a way to prevent the United States from becoming
a safe harbor for hate speech), available at http://www.vjolt.net/vol7/issue2/v7i2aO5-
Tsesis.pdf.
243. See BASsouINI, supra note 215, at 36 ("[T]he United States requires a treaty, as does
the United Kingdom and most common law countries.").
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court would be unlikely to allow the extradition of a defendant to a foreign
country if the extradition would be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights.
Although Congress can sometimes accomplish by treaty what it cannot legislate
under the Commerce Clause, 244 a treaty must still be consistent with the Bill of
Rights.245 An extradition treaty would likely be ruled unconstitutional if the
crime for which the fugitive was being sought would result in an action
unconstitutional in the United States.246 It appears as though none of the
provisions of the Protocol would be constitutional, with the possible exception
of the Article concerning true threats.247
However, an extradition treaty can still provide a solution. Even though
the "true threat" Article of the Protocol would likely be found unconstitutional
because it impermissibly regulates on the basis of the subject of the speech,
"true threats" are proscribable in the United States. The United States could
enter an extradition treaty providing for extradition of "true threats," as long as
the criminal statute in question is not subject-based. As a result, it is possible
for Europe to rewrite the language of the "true threat" Article in a way that
would be consistent with the First Amendment, allowing the United States to
take part in an extradition treaty if it chooses to do so.
D. A Constitutional Moment?
A final policy alternative would be for the United States to adopt the tort
action suggested by Richard Delgado and the administrative and criminal
remedies suggested by Mari Matsuda. Delgado argued for the creation of a tort
action available to victims of hate speech in his seminal Article, Words that
244. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434-35 (1920) (holding constitutional the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which gives effect to a treaty between the United States and Great
Britain, even though Congress has no power to legislate migratory birds under the Commerce
Clause).
245. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1957) (holding unconstitutional an executive
agreement authorizing military jurisdiction for crimes committed abroad by civilian dependents
of servicemen, as a violation of rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights).
246. Cf. BASSOuINI, supra note 215, at 929 (stating that in July 1996, the Italian
Constitutional Court declared its extradition treaty with the United States unconstitutional
because the United States recognizes the death penalty, which is unconstitutional under Italian
law).
247. See supra Part IV.B (analyzing the constitutionality of each of the crimes provided for
by the Protocol); see also Tsesis, supra note 242, T89 (stating that the United States would
likely qualify its participation in an extradition treaty to those cases where incitements pose an
imminent threat of harm).
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Wound.24 8 Delgado' s cause of action is not based so much on the idea of "true
threat" or "fighting words" that characterizes most legislation aimed at
repressing racist speech, but instead on the idea of harassment and emotional
distress. 249 To bring a cause of action under Delgado' s tort theory, the plaintiff
would be required to prove that: "Language was addressed to him or her by the
defendant that was intended to demean through reference to race; that the
plaintiff understood as intended to demean through reference to race; and that a
reasonable person would recognize as a racial insult."
250
Expanding on Delgado's tort action, Mari Matsuda argues for criminal and
administrative sanctions for hate speech.251 Matsuda's approach provides for
three prerequisites to prosecution for hate speech: (1) "The message is of racial
inferiority;" (2) "The message is directed against a historically oppressed
group;" and (3) "The message is persecutory, hateful, and degrading.
252
According to Matsuda, her approach would restrict redress to only the most
serious hate speech, and would appease civil libertarians' concerns of
censorship, by leaving many forms of racist speech to private remedies.253
However, the adoption of the approaches suggested by Delgado and
Matsuda has had mixed results, and despite the efforts of Delgado and Matsuda
to propose their causes of action in line with the First Amendment,254 the First
Amendment has proved problematic. Outside of true threats and fighting
words, racial insults have generally only been found actionable when they
constitute battery, harassment, or emotional distress.255 Delgado's and
248. See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133, 149 (1982) ("Because racial attitudes of
white Americans 'typically follow rather than precede actual institutional [or legal] alteration,' a
tort for racial slurs is a promising vehicle for the eradication of racism.").
249. See id. ("The psychological, sociological, and political repercussions of the racial
insult demonstrate the need for judicial relief.").
250. Id. at 179.
251. See Matsuda, supra note 157, at 17 ("Taking inspiration from Delgado's position, I
make the further suggestion that formal criminal and administrative sanction-public as
opposed to private prosecution-is also an appropriate response to racist speech.").
252. Id. at 36.
253. See id. at 50 ("[This chapter] suggests criminalization of a narrow, explicitly defined
class of racist hate speech to provide public redress for the most serious harm, leaving many
forms of racist speech to private remedies.").
254. See Delgado, supra note 248, at 172-79 (concluding that the government interest in
regulating racial insults outweighs the speaker's free speech interests, as racial insults do not
meet any of the four free speech interests articulated by Professor Emerson); Matsuda, supra
note 157, at 35 ("In the following section I suggest that an explicit and narrow definition of
racist hate messages will allow restriction consistent with first amendment values.").
255. See Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 628-30 (Tex. 1967)
(holding that the snatching of a plate from a Negro because he could not be served in the
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Matsuda's causes of action run into problems with the First Amendment
because they are based on the subject of the speech, as they both refer to
targeting insults at a person on the basis of that person' s race, running afoul of
R.A. V. 
256
But if hate speech becomes a debilitating social problem in the United
States, a "Constitutional moment" could occur. The exigencies of the Great
Depression led to a Constitutional moment, according to Ackerman, that
resulted in the United States Supreme Court abandoning a restrictive view of
the Commerce Clause, expanding it to its modem interpretation as a broad
bestowal of power to Congress.257 Given the historical protections accorded
free speech,258 and the Court's generally strict adherence to precedent, 259 it is
questionable if even a major influx of hate speech websites in America can
provoke such a reassessment of the First Amendment. However, it remains
possible. For instance, the Supreme Court has viewed with increasing favor the
principles of the European Convention of Human Rights,260 and the
Convention's opposition to hate speech may be viewed favorably by the
cafeteria was a battery because the tort is designed to protect dignity as well as physical
security); see also Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 565 P.2d 1173, 1177 (Wash. 1977)
(holding that a Mexican-American stated a claim for the tort of outrage-or intentional
infliction of emotional distress-when continuously subjected to racial jokes and slurs by fellow
employees).
256. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text (stating that in R.A.V., the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional a St. Paul ordinance because, even if the statute only regulated
"fighting words," the statute impermissibly prohibited speech based purely on the basis of the
subject of the speech).
257. See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 Yale L.J. 453,
488 (1989) (asserting that there have been three constitutional regimes in American history, and
that these regimes were inaugurated by three constitutional moments: Founding,
Reconstruction, and the New Deal).
258. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the First
Amendment protects speech that advocates violence, so long as the speech is not directed to
inciting or promoting lawless action and is not likely to incite or produce such action). But see
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,624 (1919) (upholding convictions of defendants who
published material containing language disloyal about the form of the government). The
Court's opinion in Abrams is famous for the dissent of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who laid
out the test the Court would later apply in Brandenburg: "[W]e should be eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught
with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country." Id. at 630
(Holmes, J. dissenting).
259. See Ackerman, supra note 257, at 488 (naming only three Constitutional moments in
American history).
260. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (citing a decision of the European
Court of Human Rights finding sodomy laws in violation of the European Convention on
Human Rights).
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Court. 2 6 ' The protections the United States accords speech increasingly counter
the values and regulations of the rest of the world, and the Court could view
American exceptionalism as a persuasive reason to change the interpretation of
the First Amendment.
This approach does not necessarily mean that the United States entirely
needs to throw out the Brandenburg "true threat" framework: The effect could
be as minimal as tossing out the rule in R.A. V. that speech cannot be proscribed
on the basis of the subject of the speech. If that requirement is eliminated, then
the United States could have more discretion to proscribe "true threats" that
harm or target a particularly vulnerable group. The rule has been challenged by
some for making limited logical sense because the Court acknowledges that
"true threats" are not protected, but nevertheless finds content-based statutes
unconstitutional because the statutes treat some "true threats" different from
others.262 If content is allowed to be proscribed on the basis of the subject of
the speech, then it would be possible for the remedies offered by Delgado and
Matsuda to be adopted. Even if the United States does not join the Protocol,
the adoption of their proposals would give the United States the ability to
proscribe some hate speech and enable the United States to enact a deterrent to
hate speech, making the United States a less attractive haven for hate speech.
VII. Conclusion
Although the Council of Europe's Internet Hate Speech Protocol is not
likely to result in any additional criminal or civil liability for American Internet
users and providers, it will still have an effect on American society. With the
increased cooperation of European countries to combat hate speech on the
Internet in Europe, America is likely to become a haven for hate speech. This
would be caused by both the visibility of pre-established American sites in
Europe and America's status as an attractive home for European sites escaping
the restrictions on speech present in Europe. However, there are steps that can
261. See The European Convention on Human Rights, art. 10 (Nov. 4, 1950) (stating that
everyone has the right to freedom of expression, but that is limited by those restrictions
necessary in a democratic society, including the protection of health or morals and for the
protection of the reputation or the rights of others), available at http://www.hri.org/
docs/ECHR50.html (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); id. art. 14 (stating that
the enjoyment of rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention shall be secured without
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, national origin, or association with a national
minority).
262. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 63
(1999) (stating that Scalia's content-neutral alternative in R.A.V. would drive from the
marketplace the very same ideas and viewpoints, along with others).
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be taken to mitigate the problem. Most effectively, European nations should
engage in a discourse with ISPs and seek their voluntary assistance in trying to
cut down on the speech. If that approach does not work, and the problem
becomes extremely severe, it may lead to a Constitutional moment, where the
Supreme Court reverses its First Amendment jurisprudence. This would allow
speech proscriptions on the basis of the subject of the speech, giving the United
States greater constitutional authority to proscribe hate speech.
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